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I. INTRODUCTION
The existence of copyright law reflects the notion that creative endeavors of the
mind are highly valued in our society.' The copyright encourages such efforts by
granting to authors of original expression certain exclusive rights to their works for
a limited time.2 The public, in turn, enjoys the benefit of these creations, both
practical and intellectual.3
Nonetheless, the copyright grant is not without limits. Besides the basic limit on
proper subject matter,4 several additional statutory sections further curtail the scope
of copyright protection.5 The most important of these limitations on a copyright
1. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1990) [hereinafter
Leval, Fair Use Standard] (noting that copyright law recognizes "creative intellectual activity" as "vital to the well-
being of society").
2. See id. (suggesting that copyright is a "pragmatic measure" by which society grants a limited monopoly
to authors in order to acquire creative products); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (listing the exclusive rights
accruing to the copyright owner).
3. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1109 (positing that the public gives the copyright to authors
so that it may secure "for itself the intellectual and practical enrichment that results form creative endeavors").
4. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (compromising the 1976 Copyright Act. Unless otherwise indicated, all
statutory citations and references in this Casenote are to the Copyright Act of 1976.) [hereinafter the 1976 Act]. The
1976 Act states that "[c]opyright protection subsists.., in original works of authorship," and provides an illustrative
list of what "works of authorship" include. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). The 1976 Act further limits the subject matter
of copyright, providing that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." Id. § 102(b).
5. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (1994) (containing the statutory limitations to the grant of exclusive rights
in section 106); see also Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1109-10 (listing judicially-developed limitations
on the grant of the copyright, including the lack of copyright protection for ideas and facts).
1102
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 32
owner's control over his work is the doctrine of "fair use."' 6 Fair use "permits courts
to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle
the very creativity which the law is designed to foster."'7 When applying the fair use
doctrine, 8 the Supreme Court requires that, all of the doctrine's statutory factors "be
explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright."9
Recently a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth
Circuit decided Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc.,l°
determining, in part, whether the defendant was entitled to claim fair use of the
plaintiff's copyrighted book."' The book-Mystery of the Ages-was written by the
founder and "spiritual and temporal" leader of the Worldwide Church of God, being
completed shortly before his death in 1986.2 With the copyright passing to the
church by will,' 3 the church stopped producing and distributing the book in 1988.14
It took this action because it considered the book, containing the deceased leader's
views on various subjects, to be ecclesiastical error.15 The defendant, Philadelphia
Church of God, Inc., formed by former Worldwide Church of God ministers in
1989, continued to use Mystery of the Ages in its religious practice.' 6 In 1997, after
using existing copies, the defendant began producing, without permission, its own
copy 7 of Mystery of the Ages.18
Worldwide Church of God subsequently sued Philadelphia Church of God, Inc.
for copyright infringement.' 9 In turn, the district court held that the defendant's use
of the work was statutorily protected "fair use."2° On appeal to the circuit court, two
judges concluded that the defendant was not entitled to the protection of fair use,2'
6. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 462 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that fair use is the "most important" limitation on a copyright owner because it states that "the
fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an infringement of copyright"). See generally infra Part I.B for a
discussion of the history and current formulation of the current statutory fair use doctrine.
7. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see infra Part II.B (discussing the fair use doctrine).
9. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
10. 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000). See infra Part III (discussing the facts of the case, including the district
court opinion, as well as the circuit court's majority and dissenting opinions).
11. See id. at 1115-20 (analyzing Philadelphia Church of God's claim of fair use of the copyrighted book
Mystery of the Ages).
12. Id. at 1113.
13. See id. at 1114 (finding that the copyright in Mystery of the Ages passed to Worldwide Church of God
by bequest).
14. Id. at 1122 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
15. See id. at 1113 (listing Worldwide Church of God's primary reason for removing Mystery of the Ages
from distribution was that it "conveyed outdated views that were racist in nature).
16. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1113.
17. The defendant's version of Mystery of the Ages was essentially verbatim, removing only a "Suggested
Reading" page, a warning against reproduction, and substituting Worldwide Church of God's name with that of the
former leader on the copyright page. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1113.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 1113-14 (detailing Worldwide Church of God's complaint).
20. Id. at 1114.
21. See id. at 1115-20 (reasoning why the defendant's use was not statutorily protected).
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while one judge dissented, reasoning quite forcefully that the defendant's use of
Mystery of the Ages was indeed statutorily protected fair use.22 The judgment of the
district court was thus reversed.23
This Casenote critically analyzes the Ninth Circuit's decision in Worldwide
Church of God in light of the overall purposes of copyright law. Part II reviews the
foundation of copyright law in the United States, discussing in particular the
underpinning goals of copyright law and the means chosen to further that goal.24 It
also describes the development of the doctrine of fair use, its current formulation,
and how fair use is incorporated into the overall scheme of copyright law.25 Part III
discusses in detail the Ninth Circuit's opinion, including the district court's
reasoning, the majority opinion reversing the district court's finding of fair use, and
the dissent's analysis.26 Part IV critically analyzes the majority's reasoning,
discussing each of the statutory factors as well as other surrounding observations in
light of the purposes of copyright law.27 In Part V, this Casenote concludes that the
district court and the Ninth Circuit panel's dissent were both correct in determining
that Philadelphia Church of God, Inc.'s use of Mystery of the Ages was indeed a
statutorily protected fair use, a use wholly consistent with the purposes of
copyright.28
II. FAIR USE BEFORE WORLDWIDE CHURCH OF GOD
A. The Copyright and Its Goals
"The copyright is not an inevitable, divine, or natural right .... ,29 Rather, the
copyright today is a creature of federal statute, 30 with its foundation rooted in the
United States Constitution. 3' The Constitution explicitly provides that Congress has
the power to give an author the exclusive right to his writings for a limited time.32
Flowing from this provision, Congress has the duty to determine what the
22. Id. at 1122-25 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (discussing the equitable factors and statutory factors in
concluding that Philadelphia Church of God's use was fair use).
23. Id. at 1121.
24. Infra Part I.A.
25. Infra Part I.B.
26. Infra Part III.
27. Infra Part IV.
28. Infra Part V.
29. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1107.
30. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (1994).
31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. ("The Congress shall have Power... To Promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.").
32. Id.
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parameters of the copyright monopoly will be.33 Exercising this power, Congress
passed and revised copyright legislation a number of times over the years. 34 The
most recent comprehensive revision of the copyright statute was passed in 1976. 35
Though Congress has used its constitutional power, the grant it has given is a
limited one. Copyright protection is conferred on a limited number of creations
meeting particular criteria. First, copyright only protects the "expressive content of
the work. 36 Conversely, no protection exists for ideas or facts contained within a
work.37 Additionally, only the portions of a work that "display the stamp of the
author's originality" are protected.38 Moreover, an author's original expression must
be embodied in proper subject matter, a statutory "work of authorship. 39 While the
statute provides an illustrative list4° of what constitutes a "work of authorship," the
list is not exclusive.4' Meeting these criteria, the copyright finally accrues to the
author when the original work of expressive authorship is "fixed in any tangible
medium of expression.,
42
Once conferral of a copyright occurs, however, certain rights vest in the author.
In section 106, the 1976 Act bestows upon an author of an original work a so-called
33. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 ("As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been
assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors
in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance
between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on
the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other
hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly.").
34. Id. at 460 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to the many amendments Congress has made to the
Copyright Act, including "complete revisions in 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976").
35. Copyright Revision Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
36. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,547 (1985); Salinger v. Random House,
Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1987).
37. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 95.
38. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (defining copyright protection as subsisting
only in "original works of authorship"). See Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1494 (11 th Cir. 1984) for
an example of originality found in the "editorial judgment" in presenting factual events in a news broadcast.
"Originality" is to be distinguished from "novelty": originality means only that a work is independently created,
but not that it be novel, a more difficult threshold to meet. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A] at 2-7 (2001).
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine of device.").
40. Id. The list includes: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3)
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8)
architectural works. Id.
41. See id. § 102(a) (stating that works of authorship "include" the illustrative list). The statute defines the
term "including" to mean "illustrative and not limitative." Id. § 101.
42. See id. § 102(a) (reading that a work of authorship must be "fixed in any tangible medium of expression
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device").
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"bundle of rights" in that work. 43 These rights are exclusive to the copyright
owner. With such a broad monopoly given to authors, the reasons for such a grant
need be explained.
The undergirding for such a broad grant of rights lies, at its heart, in the
utilitarian purposes of copyright.
The monopoly privileges ... are... [not] primarily designed to provide a
special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after
the limited period of exclusive control has expired.45
Besides the utilitarian purpose of encouraging creation of works of authorship,
copyright law has the complementary goal of dissemination and use of protected
works.46 As a corollary of these public purposes, protection of one's privacy is not
a goal of copyright law.47 Therefore, through this mechanism, copyright law
43. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546-47 (1985) (noting that section 106 "confers a bundle of exclusive
rights to the owner of the copyright... [which] vest in the author of an original work from the time of its creation").
The statute grants to the copyright owner in a work, subject to sections 107 through 121, the exclusive rights to
reproduce, distribute, publicly perform, display, and prepare derivative works; in the case of sound recordings, the
right to publicly perform them by digital audio transmission is also granted. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
44. Id.
45. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429; see also Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (positing that
"copyright law ... makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration"); Pacific & S., 744 F.2d at 1499 n.14
(noting that through copyright Congress developed a system that "encourages creativity by giving authors the
exclusive rights to profit from their works in certain ways"). "Since authors most often profit by distributing their
works to the public, society usually benefits." Id.; H. R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909)
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based
upon any natural right that the author has in his writings.... but upon the ground that the welfare of the
public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for
limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings ....
Michael G. Anderson et al., Market Substitution and Copyrights: Predicting Fair Use Case Law, 10 U. MIAMi ENT.
& SPORTS L. REV. 33, 34 (1993) (noting that the "emphasis of copyright law is on the benefits derived by the
public"); "Reward to copyright owners or authors is necessary, but of secondary consideration." Id.; Leval, Fair
Use Standard, supra note I, at 1107 (arguing that the Supreme Court has summarized the purpose of copyright as
being "to stimulate activity and progress in the art for the intellectual enrichment of the public"). "This utilitarian
goal is achieved by permitting authors to reap the rewards of their creative efforts." Id.
46. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228; Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law,
43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233, 245 (1998).
47. See Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1119 (stating that the law of privacy and not copyright
law protects private documents); see id. n.67 (arguing that "[clonstruing [copyright's] rules as more solicitous of
an intention to conceal than to publish contravenes its purposes"). Others have argued that copyright should indeed
protect privacy interests. See Benjamin Ely Marks, Note, Copyright Protection, Privacy Rights, and the Fair Use
Doctrine: The Post-Salinger Decade Reconsidered, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1376 (1997) (arguing for a privacy-based
exception to fair use for unpublished works not intended for publication).
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encourages the flow of ideas,48 the ultimate end being the increase of the public store
of knowledge.49
Support for this utilitarian construction is ample. Foremost is the Constitution
itself. The clause permitting Congress to confer the monopoly further states that
such monopoly exist "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 50 From
this phrase, it follows that Congress may not even grant copyright protections unless
such protections serve this goal.51 The "for limited times" language,52 limiting the
duration of the monopoly, further supports the constitutional interpretation that the
copyright is for the public purpose, and not inhering in the author as a natural right. 53
From the very beginning, Congress recognized this interpretation, entitling the first
copyright act, "An Act for the encouragement of learning.,
54
Thus, with this grand utilitarian purpose behind the constitutional and statutory
scheme, the grant of the copyright to an author has never given an author a complete
monopoly over his work.55 An author's entitlement to the privileges under copyright
are balanced against the "public's interest in the free and immediate access to
materials essential to the development of society., 56 This reflects a recognition that
circumstances exist in which mechanistic enforcement of the statutory monopoly
would thwart the goals that copyright seeks to further.57 By giving copyright holders
the power to control, to reproduce, and disseminate their works, the free flow of
information and subsequent creation of new works based upon them, may be
impeded. 8 Hence, there are exceptions to an author's bundle of rights. These
48. See Pacific & S., 744 F.2d at 1499 (noting that while the First Amendment "removes obstacles to the
free flow of ideas, copyright law adds positive incentives to encourage the flow").
49. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 545 (noting that copyright law is "intended to increase and not to impede
the harvest of knowledge").
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
51. Pacific & S., 744 F.2d at 1498 (arguing that the "Constitution allows Congress to create copyright laws
only if they benefit society as a whole rather than authors alone"). However, the Eleventh Circuit also posited that
though this constitutional requirement exists, each copyright owner does not have to offer a benefit to all of society,
"for the copyright is an incentive rather than a command." id. at 1499.
52. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, c1. 8 (stating that Congress may "secure" to "[aluthors" exclusive rights "for
limited [t]imes").
53. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1108.
54. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1802).
55. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 432 (noting that the copyright monopoly has never given an owner of a copyright
"complete control over all possible uses of his work"); id. at 462-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The 1976 Act, like
its predecessors, does not give the copyright owner full and complete control over all possible uses of his work.").
56. Marks, supra note 47, at 1377.
57. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[tihere are situations... in which
strict enforcement of this monopoly would inhibit the very 'Progress of Science and useful Arts' that copyright is
intended to promote"); Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d
Cir. 1980) ("The doctrine of fair use, originally created and articulated in case law, permits courts to avoid rigid
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed
to foster."); Pacific & S., 744 F.2d at 1495 ("Where strict enforcement of the rights of a copyright holder.., would
conflict with the purpose of copyright or with some other important societal value, courts should be free to fashion
an appropriate fair use exemption.").
58. Dratler, supra note 46, at 245.
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exceptions immediately follow the grant of exclusive rights in section 106 in the
1976 Act.59
B. Fair Use
The most important exception to the copyright monopoly, applying to all
entitlements in the bundle of rights,60 is the "fair use" doctrine. 61 "From the infancy
of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has
been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, 'to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts . ...,,6' Briefly described, the doctrine protects from
liability an infringing use of copyrighted material "where the benefit to society of
permitting the unauthorized use outweighs the harm to society of reducing the
incentive to create new works. 63 Its application has the effect of softening the
results of strict adhesion to copyright protections, 64 making the doctrine a "critical
safety valve of copyright., 65 Fair use, thus, is an integral part of copyright law, 66
itself serving the purpose of creating new works of authorship.67
A fair use analysis addresses the inherent tensions arising as a result of the
copyright monopoly. It "allows a court to resolve tensions between the ends of
copyright law, public enjoyment of creative works, and the means chosen under
copyright law, the conferral of economic benefits upon creators of original works. 68
Put another way, fair use "is a means of balancing the need to provide individuals
59. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (comprising the sections limiting the exclusive rights set forth in section 106).
60. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 95. See Dratler, supra note 46, at 244 (noting that the doctrine applies to any
copyrighted work).
61. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 462 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that section 107 is the "most important"
limitation on the rights of a copyright owner).
62. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
63. Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L.
REV. 677, 678 (1995). See Anderson et al., supra note 45, at 39 (positing that fair use exists when enforcement of
a copyright does not further copyright goals).
64. See Dratler, supra note 46, at 245 (noting that fair use gives copyright "great flexibility" and "softens
the contours of copyright law as circumstances demand").
65. William F. Patry and Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 668 (1993).
66. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that fair use "plays a crucial role in the
law of copyright"); Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1107 (arguing that fair use is "not... a disorderly
basket of exception to the rule of copyright, nor as a departure from the principles governing that body of law, but
... a rational, integral part of copyright, whose observance is necessary to achieve the objectives of that law"); id.
at 1110 ("Fair use should not be considered a bizarre, occasionally tolerated departure from the grand conception
of the copyright monopoly."). Judge Leval argues that the doctrine indeed is a "necessary part of the overall design."
Id.
67. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 495 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the purpose of fair use is to create
"new works"); Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1110 (noting that fair use limits the copyright in
"furtherance of its utilitarian objective"). But see L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1987) (arguing that fair use as codified has broadened the copyright monopoly by giving increased
control of access to copyrighted works).
68. Pacific & S., 744 F.2d at 1495.
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with sufficient incentives to create public works with the public's interest in the
dissemination of information., 69 Remembering that the doctrine itself seeks to
produce new works, reduction of the "creative ability" of secondary users resulting
from total monopolies is also weighed against the deprivation of an author's
incentive to create. 70 Hence, the doctrine seeks to provide an exception, albeit a
limited one, to the copyright owner's rights in his protected work in order to
encourage particular productive uses of that work.7'
Perhaps a result of the sensitive balancing inherent in a fair use evaluation, the
doctrine has been described as an "equitable rule of reason."72 As such,
characterizations of the doctrine vary widely. Some courts have labeled fair use a
privilege to "use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without [the
owner's] consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner., 73 Another
court has described the doctrine as tolerating secondary uses that are "exceptions to
copyright protection. '74 That the doctrine "excuses an otherwise infringing use" is
yet another characterization. 75 Despite these variations, however, the Supreme Court
69. Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1986). See Weissman v.
Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1323 (2d Cir. 1989) (arguing that fair use "balances the exclusive right of copyright
owners against 'the public's interest in the dissemination of information affecting areas of universal concern, such
as art, science and industry") (quoting Wainright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir.
1977)); Dratler, supra note 46, at 246-47 (positing that the fair use doctrine "strikes a balance between the policies
of fostering creativity and encouraging wide dissemination and use of creative works").
70. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 479 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The fair use doctrine must strike a balance
between the dual risks created by the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving authors of their monopoly
will reduce their incentive to create, and, on the other, that granting authors a complete monopoly will reduce the
creative ability of others.").
71. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1255(2d Cir. 1986). See Dratler, supra note 46, at 234
(arguing that fair use has the purpose to "cushion the hard edges of copyright law and permit other to build upon
the foundations of earlier copyrighted works, without negotiating a license in every case"); Anna M. Budde,
Comment, Photocopyingfor Research: A Fair Use Exception Favoring the Progress of Science and the UsefulA rts,
42 WAYNE L. REv. 1999, 2024 (1996) (arguing that the ultimate aim through the giving of the private incentive is
to "stimulate artistic creativity for the public good") (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156 (1975)).
72. Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d at 1156; see Pacific & S.,744 F.2d at 1495 (indicating that the fair use
doctrine "function[s] as a 'rule of reason"'); Iowa State, 621 F.2d at 62 (noting that "the fair use doctrine 'is entirely
equitable') (quoting Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y (1968)); see also Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 553 (referring to a "balance of equities" in assessing a fair use claim). But see Sony, 464 U.S.
at 495 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's proposition that fair use is a "general" equitable rule
of reason "mischaracterizes the doctrine, and simply ignores the language of the statute").
73. Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Rosemont Enters. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967)). See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
547 (noting that section 107 codified the "traditional privilege" of fair use); Weissman, 868 F.2d at 1323 (describing
fair use as a "privilege for others to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner despite the lack of the
owner's consent").
74. Pacific & S., 744 F.2d at 1494 (emphasis added). But see Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1107
(arguing that fair use should not be characterized as an exception to copyrighted protection, but an "integral part
of copyright").
75. Lape, supra note 63, at 678 (emphasis added).
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is clear that fair use is an affirmative defense to an action for copyright
infringement.
76
Perhaps another result of the inherent balancing attached to any evaluation, the
fair use doctrine has been accused of being "the most troublesome in the whole law
of copyright., 77 The truth of this accusation is no more apparent than when
determining whether the doctrine should apply in a particular case. Application of
fair use has enjoyed no precise definition. This attribute is not from any failing by
Congress or the judiciary, but due to its equitable nature.79 Nevertheless, even if by
design, courts have trouble applying this loosely defined doctrine in a consistent
manner.
80
The doctrine of fair use has its American origins in court opinions of the
nineteenth century,8' having been recognized since the passage of the first copyright
legislation.82 Since its beginnings, "fair use has been refined, honed, and clarified
in many Court decisions. 83 Under these early opinions, courts determined whether
76. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403
(1997); see Dratler, supra note 46, at 257 (labeling fair use as a "complete defense" to copyright infringement); id.
at 235 (calling fair use the "paradigmatic 'catch-all,"' relieving technical infringers of liability when it would not
comport with the goals of copyright).
77. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2nd Cir. 1939) (per curiam); see Maxtone-Graham,
803 F.2d at 1255 (reaffirming the validity of the statement made in Dellar); see also Triangle Publ'ns Inc. v. Knight-
Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that "no definition of fair use that is
"workable in every case has ever evolved"); Stephen M. McJohn, Fair Use and Privatization in Copyright, 35 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 61, 73 (1998) (stating that the doctrine is "considered difficult and unpredictable"). Other
commentators say that fair use is indeed a predictable doctrine. See Anderson et al., supra note 45, at 34 (arguing
that fair use is indeed predictable, found only when a secondary use does not amount to a market substitute for the
original). The doctrine's alleged unpredictability may not necessarily be an inherent flaw in its makeup. See
Mclohn, supra note 77, at 91 (suggesting that the elusive definition of fair use may be "key to its flexible role");
id. at 108-09 (explaining that the difficulty in defining fair use is a reflection of the overall difficulty in determining
the parameters of copyright law).
78. See Dratler, supra note 46, at 235 (positing that fair use "has no crisp outlines, no precise standards, and
no obvious center or core"); Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1106 (noting that judges do not have a
common view as to the doctrine's meaning); Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 669 (noting that section 107 is
"open-ended and flexible"); id. at 669 (stating that the 1976 Act does not define fair use).
79. See Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 68 (positing that the "thorniness of fair use.., is inherent in
the common law nature of the doctrine as a multifaceted process by which courts can finely calibrate not only the
equities between the parties in a given case, but also the fundamental public policies at stake in drawing the line
between private property and free use").
80. See Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1105 (arguing that in the development of fair use courts
had failed to develop a "set of governing principles or values"). Judge Leval further criticized court decisions,
arguing that decisions "seem... to result from intuitive reactions to individual fact patterns." Id. Judge Leval argued
that there was indeed an underlying framework of values from which to decide cases with consistency. Id., passim.
81. Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 668.
82. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576 (arguing that "although the First Congress enacted our initial copyright
statute ... without any explicit reference to 'fair use,' . . . the doctrine was recognized by the American courts
nonetheless"). Fair use has even deeper roots in the common law, where it was known as "abridgement." Maxtone-
Graham, 803 F.2d at 1259. An early case to raise this defense was Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141 (1740) (No. 130).
83. Triangle Publ'ns; 626 F.2d at 1174 (5th Cir. 1980). See Pacific & S., 744 F2d at 1494 (indicating that
courts developed the fair use doctrine); Marks, supra note 47, at 1377 (noting that fair use "developed out ofjudicial
recognition that certain acts of copying are defensible when the public interest in permitting the copying outweighs
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one was allowed to make an unauthorized use of copyrighted material by engaging
in a "case-specific analysis of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the
entire complex of facts and equities presented. 84 The contours and development of
fair use remained entirely within the province of the courts until it found statutory
formulation.85 Justice Story's opinion in the 1841 case of Folsom v. Marsh86 is often
cited as the basis for the modem formulation of fair use.87 In Folsom, Justice Story
wrote that courts viewing the secondary work should consider: "The nature and
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede
the objects of the original work., 88
Codification came about with the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976.89
Possibly, by this Act, Congress wanted to move fair use from an "ad hoc balancing
of policy to ... the development of predictable standards." 90 However, Congress
was clear that its intent was to leave the doctrine as it had developed, and "not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way."9' Codification thus reflected the evolution
of the test as it developed in the courts.92 Beyond this, the development of fair use
was to continue within the courts even after codification. 93 Thus, the 1976 Act was
the author's interest in copyright protection").
84. Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 668-69.
85. Id. at 669; see Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d at 1151 (asserting that "Congress incorporated this common
law doctrine into section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976").
86. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
87. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576-91 (comparing the current doctrine with Justice Story's language); Pierre
N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449,1452 (1997) (calling Folsom v. Marsh the
"most important source" of fair use doctrine in America). But see L. Ray Patterson, The Worst Intellectual Property
Opinion Ever Written: Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431,431 (1998) (arguing that Folsom
did not create fair use, but instead redefined copyright infringement at that time).
88. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.
89. Copyright Revision Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
90. Dratler, supra note 46, at 253.
91. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.A.N. 5659, 5679.
92. Triangle Publ'ns, 626 F.2d at 1174; see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547 (listing section 107 as the
codification of the "traditional privilege of other authors to make 'fair use' of an earlier writer's work"); id. at 549
(noting that Congress codified the common-law doctrine in section 107); Pacific & S., 744 F2d at 1494 (indicating
that the judicial formulation of fair use was codified in the 1976 Act without significant change); Iowa State, 621
F.2d at 60 (noting that evolution of the doctrine of fair use in the case law reveals that the four statutory factors had
traditionally been examined); Dratler, supra note 46, at 235 (noting that Congress was clear that it did not intend
to change fair use); McJohn, supra note 77, at 72 (suggesting that, the statutory factors were "drawn" from Justice
Story's opinion in Folsom); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A] at 13-
154 (2001) [hereinafter 4 NIMMER] (indicating that the four statutory factors were largely "culled from the prior case
law"). But see Pacific & S., 744 F.2d at 1495 n.7 (stating that the "House Committee on the Judiciary may have
overstated its intention to leave the doctrine of fair use unchanged, because the statute clearly offers new guidance
for courts considering fair use defense[s] ... establish[ing] a minimum number of inquiries that a court must carry
out").
93. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 596 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the passing of section 107
"presumes that rules will emerge from the course of decisions"); Triangle Publ'ns, 626 F.2d at 1174 (arguing that
Congress "made clear" that the codification of fair use was "in no way intended to depart from Court-created
principles or to short-circuit further judicial development"); Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1260 (illustrating that
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merely a statutory recognition of the existing doctrine and instruction to the courts
to the doctrine's continued development, rather than creation of a new body of
rules.94
The statute, in fact, largely reflects Justice Story's words in Folsom.95 Section
107 of the 1976 Act contains the doctrine in its current formulation and reads in
pertinent part:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work[.]9 6
Section 107 thus commands courts to consider four statutory factors in deciding
whether fair use applies. 9' All four statutory factors must be considered together "in
light of the purposes of copyright."98 Every factor addresses a different aspect of the
issue, each one asking the evaluator to decide how a finding of fair use would either
further or impede the goals of copyright. 99
with the passage of section 107 Congress indicated its intent to "give courts the freedom to adapt the doctrine to
particular situations on a case-by-case basis"); Dratler, supra note 46, at 253 (noting that Congress passed the four
statutory factors in the hopes that courts would develop consistent rules); see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 65 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679 (noting that "no real definition of the concept has ever emerged").
94. Patry &Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 674. "It is therefore misleading to characterize section 107 as a
'codification' of the doctrine." Id.
95. See Campbell, 510 U.S. passim (using Justice Story's language in Folsom in its illustration of the
statutory factors); Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1105 (arguing that the 1976 Act "largely adopted
[Justice Story's] summary").
96. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
97. See Pacific & S., 744 F.2d at 1495 (noting that section 107's use of "mandatory language" requires
examination of all four factors). Arguing that all four factors must be analyzed, the Pacific & Southern court
criticized the district court for essentially creating a rule that secondary uses must be "inherently productive or
creative" to be considered fair use: "a doctrine meant to resolve unforeseen conflicts of values should not turn on
such a narrow inquiry." Id. at 1495.
98. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
99. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1111.
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Apart from listing the factors to be considered, however, the statute itself does
not give much guidance in their application to a given case.' ° Though all factors
must be considered, they are not simply evaluated individually, with the party
gathering the majority winning the fair use analysis.'01 Application of fair use under
the statute does not lend itself to such mechanistic application of the factors, but
rather requires the court to engage in a fact-sensitive analysis.'0 2 When Congress
passed section 107, it gave no particular weight to any of the four statutory
factors. 10 3 A factor may be analyzed, but then deemed unhelpful to the analysis in
the context of the issue at hand.'0n In fact, varying the weight given to each factor
with the specifics of the case and entertaining additional factors, is a consistent way
to apply the doctrine.'0 5 Indeed, such flexibility in the doctrine is necessary for fair
use to successfully operate.
10 6
Courts are therefore further allowed to entertain considerations other than the
four statutory factors, as Congress did not intend that they be exclusive.'0 7 For
100. McJohn, supra note 77, at 73; see Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1105-06 (noting that
section 107 gives "little guidance on how to recognize fair use").
101. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1110.
102. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (noting that applying fair use "is not to be simplified with bright-line
rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis"); Sony, 464 U.S. at 479-480
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the fair use analysis is "necessarily a flexible one, and the endless variety
of situations that may arise precludes the formulation of exact rules"); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552 (positing that
a fair use analysis "must always be tailored to the individual case"); Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d at 1151-52
("Courts balance these factors to determine whether the public interest in the free flow of information outweighs
the copyright holder's interest in exclusive control over the work."); Weissman, 868 F.2d at 1323 (noting that a
proposed application of fair use requires a case-sensitive analysis); Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1254 (noting that
fair use requires a "difficult case-by-case balancing of complex factors"); Iowa State, 621 F.2d at 60 (arguing that
the case law has emphasized that a fair use determination depends on the facts of the case before the court and
cannot be resolved through fixed criteria). Though Justice Blackmun warned against bright-line rules in fair use,
he also stated that the legislative history suggesting that a case-by-case approach is correct was created only in the
context of productive secondary uses. Sony, 464 U.S. at 497 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. See Triangle Publ'ns, 626 F.2d at 1175 (indicating that the 1976 Act does not reveal how much weight
is to be given each statutory factor); Pacific & S., 744 F.2d at 1495 n.7 (suggesting that section 107 leaves it to the
courts to decide how much weight to attribute each factor); 4 NIMMER, supra note 92, § 13.05 at 13-153 (noting that
section 107 "gives no guidance as to the relative weight to be ascribed to each of the listed factors"); see also Dr
Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1402 (asserting that the second statutory factor "typically has not been terribly significant in the
overall fair use balancing"). Illustrating the notion that courts can attribute uneven weight to the factors in a given
case analysis, the Pacific & Southern court in fact noted in its own evaluation that the second statutory factor had
"limited impact" on the outcome of its particular case. 744 F.2d at 1497.
104. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (analyzing briefly the second factor regarding the defendant's parody of
the plaintiff's original song, terming it "not much help" in deciding the case, since parodies "almost invariably copy
publicly known, expressive works").
105. See Dratler, supra note 46, at 259 (suggesting that such an approach would lead to more decisional
consistency).
106. Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 668.
107. Sony, 464 U.S. at 476 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1260; but see Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the four statutory factors "provide substantial guidance
to courts undertaking the proper fact-specific inquiry," despite the case-sensitive analysis); Hustler Magazine, 796
F.2d at 1151 n.4 (positing that the legislative history of section 107 was clear that the four statutory factors are not
exclusive considerations); Pacific & S., 744 F.2d at 1495 n.7 (suggesting that section 107 leaves it to the court to
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example, evaluating the equities surrounding the case may be an initial
consideration.'0 8 Likewise, policy considerations may play into the broader
analysis.'°9 In fact, it is entirely possible that in some cases, factors other than the
four statutory ones may be more important, given the set of facts before the court." 0
Nevertheless, most courts rely almost exclusively on the four statutory factors. 1"
Even if a court should decide to evaluate other considerations, each analysis should
at the very least begin with the statutory factors. 12 Further illustration of these
factors as they are interpreted by the courts will provide a better framework to assess
the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Worldwide Church of God.
1. The Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor-"the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes"' 3 -draws
from Justice Story's statement, "the nature and objects of the selections made."'"14
This factor asks one to consider the justification for the secondary use of the
copyrighted material.' 15 Answering this lies in deciding whether the secondary use
"fulfill[s] the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity for public
illumination."' 16
decide how to "supplement" the statutory factors); Triangle Publ'ns, 626 F.2d at 1175 (arguing that "since the
statutory formulation is simply a restatement of the case law, it is appropriate to look to the cases for guidance").
Further support comes from the text of section 107 itself, directing a fair use determination to "include" the statutory
factors. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). "Include" means "illustrative and not limitative." 17 U.S.C. § 101. See generally
Pacific & S., 744 F.2d at 1497-98 (analyzing plaintiff's alleged duty as a public trustee to provide public access to
new broadcasts as a "fifth factor" in its fair use analysis); id. at 1498 n. 13 (indicating that an analysis of an alleged
conflict between the copyright monopoly and the goals of copyright in a particular case is proper to analyze under
fair use); Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1264 (assessing good faith of the secondary user in its fair use analysis).
108. See Weissman, 868 F.2d at 1323 (arguing that the fair use "[a]nalysis begins not by elevating the
statutory guides into inflexible rules, but with a review of the underlying equities"). See generally New Era Publ'ns
Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 1990) (considering "[o]ther [flactors" apart from the
statutory factors as part of its fair use inquiry); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d
Cir. 1966) (balancing the public interest in having access to the plaintiff's original work against the plaintiff's
interest in privacy).
109. See Dratler, supra note 46, at 250 (suggesting that two leading cases-Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 420 U.S. 376 (1974), and Rosemont Enterprise. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1966)-"illustrate the importance of policy in a fair use analysis"). In Williams & Wilkins, the interest in
dissemination of the work centered on access to medical literature for the progress in medicine, while in Rosemont
it was the public's right to know about a well-known figure. Dratler, supra note 46, at 249.
110. See Dratler, supra note 46, at 258 & n. 121 (noting that in the Nation case the unpublished status of the
original work was attributed great weight).
Ill. Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the Integrity of Copyright,
31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 7 (1999).
112. See Dratler, supra note 46, at 260 (stating that the fair use analysis should not begin with policy and
equity consideration).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 107(l) (1994).
114. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F Cas. 342, 348).
115. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1111.
116. Id. Indeed, Judge Leval states that this question "lies at the heart of the fair user's case." Id.
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Under the statutory formulation, many secondary uses of copyrighted material
may constitute fair use of the original material, and fair uses are not limited to the
listed uses in the preamble to section 107.117 However, a use consistent with one
listed in the preamble by no means guarantees that it will be found to be fair.1 8
Nevertheless, the language of the statute in the preamble, the legislative history, and
copyright policy all suggest that "productive" uses are favored under section 107.119
The way to determine how productive a use is, and one which the Supreme Court
has adopted, 2 ° is to ask how "transformative" the secondary use is.12 ' This requires
the evaluator to determine whether the secondary use simply "supersedes the
objects"' 122 of the original or "instead adds something new, with a further purpose
or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message."'' 23 The less productive or transformative a use is, the less likely it will be
found a fair use. 24 Productive/transformative uses are favored because they are more
consistent with the underlying goal of furthering the science and arts.
25
As a starting point to determine more narrowly what types of secondary uses the
doctrine seeks to protect, section 107's illustrative list provides guidance. 126 These
117. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78. (noting that section 107 "employs the terms 'including' and 'such
as' in the preamble paragraph to indicate the 'illustrative and not limitative' function of the examples given, which
thus provide only general guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found
to be fair uses") (internal citation omitted); see also Pacific & S., 744 F.2d at 1496 (indicating that, based on the
uses listed in the preamble, fair uses are only those which "contribute in some way to the public welfare").
118. See McJohn, supra note 77, at 72 (suggesting that uses not in the preamble might be found to be fair use
while uses listed in the preamble may not); Dratler, supra note 46, at 257 (noting that a preamble use is not
"automatically fair").
119. Dratler, supra note 46, at 294.
120. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79 (noting the favorable treatment given productive uses); see also Lape,
supra note 63, at 677-78 (noting that the Supreme Court has "enthusiastically" adopted the productive use standard).
121. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1111. Judge Leval further illustrated what constitutes a
transformative use: "quoted matter... used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new
aesthetics, new insights and understandings ... is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to
protect for the enrichment of society." Id. Uses may include "criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character
of the original author, proving a fact, or summarizing an idea argued in the original in order to defend or rebut it."
Id.
122. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh).
123. Id. See Dr Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1400 (illustrating that the first statutory factor requires determining
whether a secondary use alters the original with "new expression, meaning or message").
124. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1111 (arguing that mere republishing of the original work
will not likely be found to be a fair use).
125. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (positing that "the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works"). The Court recognized that the "obvious statutory
exception" to a transformative use requirement is the use of multiple copies for classroom distribution. id. at 579
n.l 1. The Supreme Court has also noted that transformative works "lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the less
will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use. Id. at 579
(internal citation omitted). See also Sony, 464 U.S. at 480 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that "when a user
reproduces an entire work and uses it for its original purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doctrine of
fair use usually does not apply").
126. See Leval, supra note 1, at 1110 (suggesting that the preamble provides that "fair use may be made for
generally educational or illuminating purposes").
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uses, with the exception of "multiple copies for classroom use," contain the common
theme of productive use.127 Nevertheless, these examples are only a guide, not an
exhaustive list.' 28 Indeed, too much adhesion to the examples listed in the preamble
would make the first factor superfluous. 129
Transformative/productive use is therefore not "absolutely necessary" to find
fair use, though such a use is more consistent with copyright's underlying goal of
furthering science and the arts. 30 The inclusion of "multiple copies for classroom
use" in the preamble is clearly indicative of the doctrine's ability to exist when there
is a nontransformative/nonproductive secondary use.' 3' As the Supreme Court has
stated, "[t]he distinction between 'productive' and 'unproductive' uses may be
helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be wholly determinative."' 132
The first factor also suggests an inquiry into any "commercial nature" or
"nonprofit educational purpose" of the secondary work. 33 However, this is only one
question in the broader inquiry: "the mere fact that a use is educational and not for
profit does not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any more than the
commercial character of a use bars a finding of fairness."' 34 Indeed, the effect of a
commercial secondary use of a work may be minimized if other countervailing
interests are served by the secondary use, such as a public interest.'35 Similarly, a
commercial secondary use may be less significant the more transformative the use
is. 136 Hence, a commercial secondary use gives no rise to a presumption against fair
use. 137
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second statutory factor-"the nature of the copyrighted work"138-- owes its
origin to Justice Story's "value of the materials used."' 39 Whereas the first factor
127. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
128. See Pacific & S., 744 F.2d at 1495 (indicating that the preamble to section 107 "merely illustrates the
sorts of uses likely to qualify as fair uses under the four listed factors").
129. Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 675-76.
130. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
131. Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 675.
132. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
133. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1994).
134. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
135. See Triangle Publ'ns, 626 F2d at 1176 (noting that the commercial use surrounding the defendant's use
of the plaintiffs magazine covers in advertisements for a competing magazine was minimized since the public
benefited from comparative advertising); Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 307-308 (suggesting that commercial gain' by the
secondary user may nevertheless constitute fair use when there is a public benefit achieved).
136. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
137. See id. at 584 (arguing that if"commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the
presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble of section 107" since they are
done with a profit motive); Triangle Publ'ns, 626 F.2d at 1175 (arguing that "commercial motive" in the secondary
use of a copyrighted work is relevant, but "certainly not decisive").
138. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1994).
139. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
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focuses on whether the secondary use advances the public pool of knowledge, 140 this
factor focuses on the incentives for the author to create.' 41 It recognizes that some
works are more amenable to copying for fair use purposes than others.1
42
Generally, this factor revolves around the factual or creative nature of the work.
A court places the original work on the "spectrum from fact to fancy."' 143 "The scope
of fair use is greater when 'informational' as opposed to more 'creative' works are
involved."' 144 Deciding where a work falls on the spectrum is not a simple practice.
One court suggests that what may be helpful in finding whether an original work is
closer to the core of copyright protection is asking whether the work is "imaginative
and original, or whether it represent[s] a substantial investment of time and labor
made in anticipation of a financial return."'' 45 Regarding a work that is primarily
factual, there is no "bright-line test."'' 46 The Second Circuit refers to factual works,
somewhat circularly, as "essentially factual in nature"'' 47  and "primarily
informational rather than creative."'' 48 This reduced protection for factual works
stems from copyright law's refrain from protecting facts and ideas.
149
Factors other than the factual/creative nature of the work are relevant as well to
the overall inquiry. One of these considerations is whether the original work, even
if creative, is of the type copyright law intended to encourage. 50 Judge Pierre Leval
of the Second Circuit points out that copyright law was not intended to encourage
individuals to write shopping lists or love letters, even though these writings may
enjoy the benefit of a copyright. 51 Additionally, the published or unpublished nature
140. See supra notes 115-37 and accompanying text.
141. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1116. See id. at 1122 (noting that this factor "concerns the
protection of the reasonable expectations of one who engages in the kinds of creation/authorship that the copyright
seeks to encourage").
142. Id. at 1116. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (illustrating that the second statutory factor "calls for
recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the
consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied").
143. Dratler, supra note 46, at 303.
144. Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d at 1153-54. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563 (noting that the "law
generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy").
145. Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d at 1154.
146. New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1990); see Dratler, supra note
46, at 304 (noting that there is "no precise dividing line" between factual and creative works).
147. Maxtone-Graham, 803 F2d at 1263.
148. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983).
149. See Dratler, supra note 46, at 304 (arguing that more liberal use of factual works is allowed not only
because the law does not protect them, but also because some facts lend themselves to few forms of expression);
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which
it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
150. See Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1119-20 (discussing that copyright law was not designed
to encourage certain types of creations).
151. Id. at 1119.
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of the original work may have weight.1 52 A work that is unpublished will likely
enjoy greater protection from fair use than a work that is published. 153 Ultimately,
however, evaluation of the second factor "concerns the protection of the reasonable
expectations of one who engages in the kinds of creation/authorship that the
copyright seeks to encourage."' 154
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in Relation to the
Copyrighted Work as a Whole
"The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole"'155 mimics Justice Story's "the quantity and value of the materials
used."' 56 Generally speaking, the greater amount used, the less likely there is fair
use. 5 7 However, this factor is more than a simple exercise in comparing how much
was taken in relation to the original as a whole: "[t]oo mechanical a rule... can be
dangerously misleading."' 5 8 This factor thus requires quantative and qualitative
assessment. 159
Regarding the quantitative aspect-"the amount ... used"-attention needs to
be paid to the first statutory factor. 16° A court must determine if the amount used
secondarily is reasonable in relation to the justification for copying the original. 161
The amount of permissible use varies with the purpose and character of the
secondary use. 162 With this relationship in mind, there exists no absolute rule as to
152. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551 (noting the "scope of fair use is narrower with respect to
unpublished works"); Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97 (noting the greater protection given to unpublished works); Henry
Holt, 873 E2d at 583 (attributing a dispositive nature against fair use to unpublished works). All three of these cases
were decided before a 1992 amendment to section 107 was passed directly addressing the published nature of the
work. After listing the four statutory factors, the section ends by reading: "The fact that a work is unpublished shall
not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors." Act of Oct.
24, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994)). This addition suggests that any
consideration of a work's unpublished status should not be dispositive.
153. Henry Holt, 873 F.2d at 583.
154. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1122.
155. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
156. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
157. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1122.
158. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1122
159. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587 (noting that the third statutory factor "calls for thought not only about
the quantity of the materials used, but about their quality and importance, too"); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 569(concluding that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit gave too little weight to the qualitative nature of the
material defendant took from plaintiff's work in its assessment of the third statutory factor).
160. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87 (noting that "[hiere, attention turns to the persuasiveness of a
parodist's justification for the particular copying done, and the enquiry will harken back to the first of the statutory
factors, for, as in prior cases, we recognized that the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and
character of the use").
161. Id. at 586; Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1123.
162. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87; see Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1123 ("A solid
transformative justification may exist for taking a few sentences that would not, however, justify a taking of larger
quantities of material.").
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how much of a copyrighted work may be used and still be labeled a fair use.163 In
fact, even wholesale copying of an original work does not per se prevent a finding
of fair use.' 64
Therefore, evaluation of the third statutory factor may turn on the qualitative
assessment-the "substantiality of the portion used."' 165 The facts considered under
this aspect will likely be considered under the fourth factor in assessing how the
secondary use will impact the market to the copyright owner of the original work. 
166
A court considers here the "quality and importance" of the work taken. 167 For
example, in Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,168 the Supreme Court
held that the Nation's verbatim use of three hundred words of an original work
thousands of words long weighed against fair use because it was "the heart" of the
original, the most exploitable part. 69 Under this formulation, the amount of a work
copied verbatim is a relevant question for the court, since it may suggest the
likelihood of market harm under the fourth factor. 70 Thus, "a work composed
primarily of an original, particularly its heart, with little added or changed, is more
likely to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling demand for the original."''
Nevertheless, the possibility remains that use of an entire work, which would
ostensibly contain its "heart," would not affect the market for the original. 
72
4. Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market for or Value of the
Copyrighted Work
The fourth factor asks the evaluator to assess "the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."' 173 A number of courts have
163. Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1263.
164. Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d at 1155. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50 (finding that wholesale copying
through videotaping of television programs for purposes of time-shifting did not lean away from fair use); Triangle
Publ'ns, 626 F.2d at 1177 n. 15 (arguing that the position that reproduction of an entire work can "never be fair use
'is an overbroad generalization, unsupported by the decisions and rejected by years of accepted practice') (quoting
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1353 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided court,
420 U.S. 376 (1975)).
165. Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1260. Judge Leval suggests that this aspect may be the more important
of the two under the third statutory factor. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1123.
166. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587; Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note I, at 1123.
167. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
168. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
169. Id. at 569. However, using "the heart" will not always tend to negate fair use. The Supreme Court in
Campbell noted that use of parody will likely employ use of the original's heart in order to conjure up the original
work. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
170. Id. at 587. The amount taken verbatim may also suggest how transformative the secondary use is. Id.
171. Id. at 587-88.
172. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1123. Judge Leval uses as an example the incorporation of
fragments of an entire sonnet into a critical work that, while using the entire original work, would not displace the
market for the poem alone. Id. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50 (concluding that wholesale copying for time-shifting
purposes did not point away from a fair use finding). '
173. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994).
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considered this factor the most important of the statutory inquiry.'74 Attributing
special importance to market effect is supportable given that this factor directly
touches the incentives for creation that an author is to reap. 75 Nonetheless,
"[m]arket harm is a matter of degree, and the importance of this factor will vary, not
only with the amount of harm, but also with the relative strength of the showing on
the other factors.' 76
Generally, a court must determine whether widespread secondary use would
detrimentally affect a potential market for the original work. 177 All that needs be
shown is that "some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists." 178 Aside from the
market for the original, the determination must also take into account harm to the
market for derivative works.179 The derivative market that a court must consider is
that which an author would "in general develop or license others to develop."'' 80
Only if the secondary use is for commercial purposes and is nothing more than
a mere duplication of the original work, may a court presume market harm.' 8'
Commercial uses beyond mere reproductions, however, do not immediately point
away from fair use. Many commercial uses may in fact weigh in favor of the
secondary user.1
82
Ultimately, a secondary use that significantly interferes with the potential
market or value of the original work impacts the author's incentives to create, and
is contrary to the goals of copyright.'83 On the other hand, "a use that has no
demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted
work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to create."' 184
174. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556 (1985) (asserting that without this factor-the "promise of copyright
would be an empty one"); Triangle Publ'ns, 626 F2d at 1175 (noting that the court's research had revealed that
courts generally emphasize potential market harm or value of the copyrighted work in application); id. at 1177(noting that the fourth statutory factor is "widely accepted to be the most important"); see also Religious Tech. Ctr.
v. Netcom On-Line Com. Servs. 9232 F.Supp. 1231, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that though all statutory factors
must be assessed, the fourth is "central"). But see Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 693-94 (stating that the
significance of Harper & Row's importance attached to the fourth factor is overstated); Leval, Fair Use Standard,
supra note 1, at 1124 (suggesting that the Supreme Court has "somewhat overstated its importance").
175. See Dratler, supra note 46, at 286 (asserting that harm to the potential market "directly implicates the
incentives for creativity that copyright law provides and that the Constitution requires").
176. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 n.21.
177. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568.
178. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
179. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568. See Dr Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1403 (analyzing the potential market for
both the original work and derivatives).
180. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
181. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (noting that any presumption of market harm is not supportable in a case
that "involv[es] something beyond mere duplication for commercial purposes"). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit presumed market harm because the defendant's use of its parody was commercial. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992).
182. See, e.g., Pacific & S. Co., 744 F.2d at 1496 (indicating that a commercial purpose where a secondary
user may use a copyrighted work and not harm the incentives to create may exist when the secondary user "profits
from an activity that the owner could not possibly take advantage of").
183. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1124.
184. Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51.
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Indeed, prohibiting such harmless uses "would merely inhibit access to ideas
without any countervailing benefit."
' 185
III. WORLDWIDE CHURCH OF GOD V. PHILADELPHIA CHURCH OF GOD, INC.
A. The Facts
Herbert Armstrong founded Worldwide Church of God (WCG), a nonprofit
religious organization, 186 in 1934.187 Until his death in 1986, Armstrong led the
church, holding the title of "Pastor General with the spiritual rank of Apostle."'
' 88
The church produced a magazine, The Plain Truth, for which Armstrong wrote more
than three thousand articles. 89
Armstrong wrote the 380-page book,190 Mystery of the Ages (MOA), between
1984 and 1985. t91 MOA was published both serially in the church's magazine 92 and
in book form. 193 In all, WCG circulated over nine million copies of MOA, all of
them free.194 Upon Armstrong's death, the copyright in MOA passed to WCG
through Armstrong's will.' 95
WCG ceased distribution of MOA two years after Armstrong's death, disposing
of excess "inventory" copies, but keeping "archival and research" copies. 196 As
reasons for the discontinued distribution, WCG cited changes in various church
doctrines; 197 the church "hoped to 'prevent a transgression of conscience by
proclaiming what the Church considered ecclesiastical error' espoused 
in MOA."'198
It believed that Armstrong conveyed views in MOA that were "racist in nature,"and
distribution stopped "because of 'cultural standards of social sensitivity' and to
185. Id.
186. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1113. Worldwide Church of God was originally named the Radio
Church of God. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id. (describing Armstrong'ss position in the church as the "undisputed spiritual and temporal leader").
189. Id. The court described Ambassador College as the church's "affiliate teaching arm." Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. This was Armstrong's final work, completed a short while prior to his death at the age of ninety-two.
Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1122 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
194. See Id. at 1113 (breaking down The Plain Truth's distribution to approximately eight million people,
plus distribution of 1.24 million copies among viewers of Worldwide Church of God telecasts and employees). It
is unclear from the court's language whether the 1.24 million copies of MOA were distributed in its serial form in
The Plain Truth or in a book format.
195. See id. at 1114-15 (discussing how the statute allows for transfer of copyright through will, and
concluding that "Armstrong's copyright passedto [Worldwide Church of God] through his Will").
196. Id. at 1113.
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avoid racial conflict."' 9 9 The church indicated that it was interested in publishing an
annotated version of MOA in the future,2°° though WCG had not yet begun work on
one.
Philadelphia Church of God ("PCG") was founded in 1989 by two former
ministers of the WCG20 to strictly "follow the teachings of Herbert Armstrong. ' 20 2
Until 1997 existing copies of MOA were used, but then PCG began to make copies
for its own use.2 °3 PCG never requested permission, copying MOA verbatim; the
only changes were the substitution of Herbert Armstrong's name for Worldwide
Church of God on the copyright page, deletion of a "Suggested Reading" page, and
removal of a reproduction warning.2°4 In addition to foreign-language versions, PCG
distributed about thirty thousand copies of MOA in English, advertised MOA in
newspapers and periodicals, and received "substantial" contributions from those
who received the work.20 5 When PCG did not respond to WCG's demand to stop
"infringing [WCG's] copyright and continued distribution of its MOA," WCG
sued. °6
B. The District Court
WCG's complaint alleged that by "reproducing, distributing, promoting,
advertising and offering unlawful and unauthorized copies of MOA," PCG was
infringing copyright.2 7 PCG's answer asserted, inter alia,2 °8 that it was protected by
the defense of the fair use doctrine.2 °9 WCG moved for partial summary judgment
and a preliminary injunction, and PCG cross-motioned for summary adjudication.1 °
The district court denied WCG's motions and granted PCG's motion, concluding
199. Id. The Church's Advisory Council of Elders stated further that "[i]nsensitivity in this area is contrary
to the doctrinal program of WCG to promote racial healing and reconciliation among the races." Id.
200. Id.








208. PCG also denied WCG's ownership of the copyright, asserted that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 barred the claim, and also
counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment regarding its right to reproduce and distribute MOA. Id. at 1113-14.
209. Id. at 1113.
210. Id.
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that the use of MOA was fair use under the statute. 1 Summarizing its finding, the
Ninth Circuit wrote that the district court
found that PCG uses MOA "for non-profit religious and educational
purposes," that copying a complete religious text "is reasonable in relation
to that use," that WCG presented no evidence that it lost members due to
PCG's distribution, that a potential annotated MOA produced by WCG
would not compete against PCG's copies of MOA, and that MOA's being
out of print provided additional justification for PCG's production of
MOA.
212
WCG challenged the district court's conclusion of fair use as both factually and
legally erroneous.213
C. The Ninth Circuit Opinion
1. The Majority Opinion
Recognizing that an appellate court may conclude as a matter of law whether a
challenged use is fair use if the record is "sufficient" to weigh all of the statutory
factors,1 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that, under the
undisputed facts, PCG's use of MOA was not fair use.2 5 The court reversed the
district court's judgment, holding that WCG was entitled to a permanent injunction
against PCG for reproduction and distribution of MOA.216
Before evaluating the fair use statutory factors, the court addressed a few
preliminary issues concerning copyright law as it applied to WCG and MOA in
particular.2t 7 The court first noted that WCG's rights to reproduce and distribute
copies of MOA were not affected by WCG's status as a nonprofit organization, nor
by its religious activity.2 8 The majority also noted that PCG's reproduction and
distribution of MOA did not fall within the specific exemption given to religious
uses of copyrighted works by section 110 of the 1976 Copyright Act, which is
limited to certain performances and displays. 2 9 The court further indicated that it
211. Id. The district court also held that Armstrong was the author of MOA and that MOA was not a work for
hire, which the Circuit Court thought implied that WCG did not own MOA's copyright. Id.
212. Id. at 1115.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1121.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1114-16.
218. Id. at 1115.
219. See id. (noting that "Congress narrowly limited the privilege accorded religious uses to 'performance
of a... literary or musical work ... or display of a work, in the course of services at a place of worship or other
religious assembly"') (citing 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (1994)).
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had to remain mindful of the problems that would arise under the Free Exercise
Clause if courts were to prevent religious organizations from seeking civil law
protections that are available to others.22° Addressing free speech concerns, the court
concluded that the interest in the free flow of information did not support a fair use
claim based on MOA's withdrawal from distribution.22 1 According to the majority,
free speech concerns are served by the statute's refusal to allow a copyright in
facts,222 and that this case was not one of WCG abusing its copyright to hide facts.223
The court furthermore asserted that the statute does not prohibit a copyright owner's
ability to keep all the copyrighted work private during it's entire term.224 Dealing
promptly with these concerns, the majority then analyzed PCG's use of MOA under
section 107.
Using the precise order of section 107, the majority first addressed the purpose
and character of PCG's use of MOA. 5 The majority recognized the focus of this
inquiry was whether the secondary use simply supersedes the purpose of the
original, or to what extent the use is instead transformative. 226 The court further
explained its inquiry, quoting Justice Story in Folsom: "'There must be real,
substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment
bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of the scissors; or extracts of the
essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original work.' 227 Applying this
illustrative language to PCG, the court concluded that the copying of MOA in its
entirety "bespeaks no 'intellectual labor and judgment,"' and "merely 'supersedes
the object' of the original ... to serve religious practice and education. ' 228 Though
recognizing that transformative use is not "'absolutely necessary,"' the court
nonetheless asserted that the absence of transformative use substantially diminishes
a claim of fair use.229
The court also rejected PCG's argument that the first factor nevertheless favored
fair use because its use was not for profit and not commercial.2 0 Adopting the
position of the Second Circuit, the majority agreed that "in weighing whether the
220. Id. The court further indicated that limiting protections for religious organizations would leave them 'at
the mercy of anyone who appropriated their property with an assertion of religious right to it." Id.
221. Id.
222. See id. (asserting that the public interest in the free flow of information is "assured by the law's refusal
to recognize a valid copyright in facts").
223. See id. at 1116 (asserting that "[tihis is not a case of 'abuse of the copyright owner's monopoly as an
instrument to suppress facts') (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559
(1985)).
224. See id. (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1990)).
225. Id. at 1117.
226. See id. at 1117 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
227. See id. (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)).
228. Id.
229. See id. (noting that "[a]lthough 'transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use,
where the use is for the same intrinsic purpose as [the copyright holder's] ... such use seriously weakens a claimed
fair use"' (citations omitted)).
230. Id. at 1117.
1124
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 32
purpose was for 'profit,' 'monetary gain is not the sole criterion... particularly in
[a] . . . setting [where] profit is ill-measured in dollars.' 23 1 Looking to the
dictionary, the court found "profit" to broadly mean an "advantage," or "benefit.
232
With this, the court reasoned that PCG "unquestionably profit[ed] ... by providing
[MOA] at no cost with the core text essential to its member's religious observance,
by attracting through distribution of MOA new members who tithe ten percent of
their income to PCG, and by enabling the ministry's growth." '233 Noting that PCG's
membership grew to around seven thousand members during the time it made and
distributed copies of MOA, the majority concluded that "[i]t is beyond dispute that
PCG 'profited' from copying MOA-it gained an 'advantage' or 'benefit' from its
distribution and use of MOA without having to account to the copyright holder.
234
Hence, PCG's nontransformative superseding and profiting use of MOA favored
WCG under the first factor.
235
Next, the court analyzed the nature of MOA.236 The majority recognized this
factor to turn "on whether the work is informational or creative.' 237 PCG described
MOA in its brief as "'primarily a textual, historical account of [Armstrong's] views
of 'the truth' of the Bible.' 238 The court, however, concluded summarily that though
MOA "may be viewed as 'factual' by readers who share Armstrong's religious
beliefs, the creativity, imagination and originality embodied in MOA tilt[ed] the
scale against fair use. 239
Turning to the third statutory factor, the majority next discussed the amount and
substantiality of what was secondarily used in relation to MOA as a whole.24° PCG
argued that its wholesale copying of MOA was reasonable because of the religious
use of the work.241 The majority did recognize that the amount of copying allowed
varies with the "'purpose and character of the use., 2 42 However, it found PCG to
be in a different position than the secondary user in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
243Inc., stating that PCG's use was for the same purpose as WCG's, while in
231. Id. (quoting Weissman, 868 F.2d at 1324).The majority also cited Harper & Row to explain the "profit"
inquiry: "The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price."
Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562).




236. Id. at 1118.
237. Id.




242. Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87 (1994)).
243. Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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Campbell the secondary use was a parodic use of the original work.4 Indicating the
importance of this distinction, the court wrote that it had previously held that
secondary use of a work for the same purpose as the copyright owner intended
strongly suggests no fair use.245
The court further asserted that "reliance on Sony [Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.]2 4 6 would be misplaced., 247 While time-shifted viewing of
television programs free of charge justified wholesale copying of videotapes in
Sony, the majority asserted that no similar "unique circumstances" justified PCG's
reproduction of MOA in its entirety.248 Rather, the court reasoned that a "reasonable
person would expect PCG to pay WCG for the right to copy and distribute MOA
created by WCG with its resources. 2 49 With this, the court held that the third factor,
too, weighed against PCG2
The court's consideration of the effect of PCG's use on the WCG's potential
market for or the value of MOA was its final and most lengthy discussion.2 1 The
court noted from the outset that it was facing a novel application of the fair use
doctrine where the copyright owner, here WCG, is a nonprofit organization.252
Indicating that though existing ease law dealt with "works marketed for profit," the
court vigorously asserted that such a history did not mean that the absence of a
"conventional market" for a work removed copyright protection from the owner, as
it would effectively prevent nonprofit organizations from holding copyrights. 3
Pointing out that the statute addresses value of the work in addition to market
effect,254 the court posited that the rewards that Congress intended a copyright owner
to have need not be strictly monetary. 55
WCG took the position that with a future annotated version of MOA, it "hope[d]
to reach out to those familiar with Armstrong's teachings and those in the broader
Christian community., 256 WCG further argued that the individuals who respond to
244. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1118 (asserting that PCG was on a "different footing" than was
the secondary user in Campbell).
245. Id. (stating that "this court has held 'that a finding that the alleged infringers copied the material to use
it for the same intrinsic purpose for which the copyright owner intended it to be used is strong indicia of no fair
use') (quoting Marcus, 695 F.2d at 1175).
246. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
247. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1118.
248. See id. (asserting that "no such circumstances exist here to justify PCG's reproduction of the entire
work").
249. Id. at 1118-19.
250. Id. at 1119.
251. Id. at 1119-20.
252. Id.
253. Id. (arguing that "[i]f evidence of actual or potential monetary loss were required, copyrights held by
nonprofits would be essentially worthless" and "[r]eligious, educational and other public interest institutions would
suffer if their publications invested with an institution's reputation and goodwill could be freely appropriated by
anyone").
254. See id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994)).
255. See id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. UniversalCity Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 447 n.28 (1984)).
256. Id.
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PCG's ads are the same people who would have interest in any annotated version
or republication of MOA by WCG, and, that PCG.'s distribution hurt WCG's
"goodwill by diverting potential members and contributions from WCG.,257 The
majority found that the "undisputed evidence" showed that those who had copies of
MOA from PCG were "present or could be potential adherents of WCG,"and that the
value of MOA was its use as a "marketing device"utilized by both PCG and WCG
in their evangelical efforts. 8
Moreover, the majority disagreed with PCG's argument that WCG's ten-year
failure to "exploit" MOA, as well as its absence of a "concrete" plan to produce a
new version, showed that MOA had no economic value to WCG that PCG's
distribution could affect.259 The court explained that the relevant inquiry is the
potential market, and that one who has indicated an intention not to publish can
change that intent.26° The court reasoned that because WCG planned to publish an
annotated version some time in the future, WCG is "entitled to protection of its
copyright. 26'
Finally, the majority considered PCG's argument that any annotated version of
MOA by WCG would be "so different as notto be competitive with PCG's MOA."
262
Believing PCG's position to be "speculative" and "miss[ing] the point," the court
stated that PCG "unfairly appropriated" all of MOA "for the very purposes for which
WCG created MOA," and that the court knew of no case that held fair use for
verbatim copying of an entire written work without criticism. 263 Though not firmly
concluding that the fourth factor favored PCG, the majority argued that the fourth
factor was, "at worst, neutral. ' 26
Weighing all four statutory factors, the majority concluded that "[o]n balance,
the defense of fair use of MOA fails. '265 Three statutory factors weighed in WCG's
favor, and the fourth leaned toward WCG, being neutral at worst.266 As such, the
court determined that, as a matter of law, PCG was not protected by fair use, and




260. See id. (explaining that "even an author who had disavowed any intention to publish his work during
his lifetime was entitled to protection of his copyright, first, because the relevant consideration was the 'potential
market' and, second, because he has the right to change his mind").
261. Id. at 1119 n.2.





267. Id. at 1121. The court reversed judgment for PCG, and the denial of WCG's motion for preliminary
injunction, and remanded "for entry of preliminary injunction pending a trial of any damages and final
adjudication." Id.
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2. The Dissent
Circuit Judge Melvin Brunetti authored the dissent, addressing solely the
majority's determination of fair use.268 Judge Brunetti, like the majority, weighed
269the statutory factors in reaching a determination. Unlike the majority, however,
Judge Brunetti gave a more thorough exposition of the equities existing between the
parties before addressing the statutory analysis.
Judge Brunetti began by noting that the copyright issue in the case arose from
a doctrinal split in WCG that caused "defrocked" ministers to found PCG.2 7'
Adherents of Herbert Armstrong's views, PCG members believed MOA to be
"divinely inspired text necessary for proper interpretation of the Bible... [and as]
required reading for every member baptized into PCG and any prospective member
prior to their attendance at church services. 272 The dissent also reiterated WCG's
decision to cease its production of MOA and its lack of current plans to publish or
distribute the work as originally written, noting in particular WCG's explanation
that it was "a 'Christian duty' to keep Armstrong's doctrinal errors out of
circulation. 273 Regarding WCG's absence of plans to publish MOA, the dissent
pointed out both the testimony of WCG leaders indicated that an "annotation of
MOA was 'not something that [was] going to be decided or happen any time soon,'
and that WCG would, at the time the case was before the court, have to complete
several tasks before any annotation could be produced.274 The dissent asserted that
the members of PCG, as followers of Armstrong's teachings, were expunged from
WCG as they "could no longer practice their religious belief as set forth in MOA,"
and it was this very situation that PCG was created and prompted the need to publish
MOA. 275 With these facts before the court, the dissent believed the court had to
"decide whether PCG's publication and distribution of MOA to church members and
the public without charge beginning January 1997 constitutes fair use. 276
The dissent, as did the majority, looked to the framework of section 107.
However, Judge Brunetti emphasized the character of fair use as an "equitable rule
of reason," and that the section 107 factors were thus for guidance. 7 As such, he
stated that there were "no bright-line rules and 'each case raising the [fair use]
268. Id. at 1122.
269. Id. at 1122-25.
270. Id. at 1122-23.
271. Id. at 1122 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
272. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
273. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
274. See id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[alpart from determining whether an annotation is
financially feasible, WCG would need to take surveys of its membership, assess its priorities, determine the format,
hire an author and researcher, and secure a publisher" before producing an annotation).
275. See id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (arguing that WCG's "doctrinal shift and renunciations" of Armstrong's
views in MOA created PCG's need to publish).
276. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
277. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
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question must be decided on its own facts.' ,278 Based on these observations Judge
Brunetti conducted his section 107 analysis.
Assessing the first factor, the dissent described PCG as a nonprofit organization
that reproduced and distributed MOA for the purpose of spreading a religious
message. 79 Judge Brunetti characterized this use of MOA as a "sharp contrast" to
other cases where the secondary use was deemed a "commercial" use. 
80
Furthermore, the dissent downplayed the majority's argument that the first factor
weighed against fair use "because PCG's use [was] not transformative and PCG
[profited] by using MOA as a marketing tool to attract new tithing members."28'
Stressing that a use need not necessarily be transformative to qualify as fair use, the
dissent posited that in PCG's case, "altering or adding to MOA would defeat PCG's
religious purpose because it believes that MOA is a divinely inspired text.2 82
Regarding any profit gained by PCG, the dissent took a more conventional "dollar"
approach to the analysis. Judge Brunetti pointed out that WCG did not challenge
PCG's assertion that its unsolicited donations in connection with the distribution of
MOA did not come close to meeting its printing costs. 283 Thus, in Judge Brunetti's
view, the noncommercial and religious aspects to PCG's purpose "overwhelm[ed]"
any commercial facets of the use, and favored a finding of fair use.284
Moreover, the dissent also considered the availability of MOA to PCG. Judge
Brunetti noted that MOA had been out of print for nearly nine years when PCG
started its production, and that MOA could only be attained through a few sources.285
To Judge Brunetti, these facts gave additional justification for PCG's use.286
The dissent analyzed the second and third statutory factors together, calling
these two factors "mostly irrelevant" to the case.287 Citing conflicting case law,
Judge Brunetti argued that MOA, as a religious text, was difficult to classify as either
a creative or an informational work.288 Turning to the amount of copying by PCG,
the dissent emphasized that copying a work in its entirety will "not weigh against
a finding of fair use if it is consistent with the noncommercial purpose and character
of the use., 289 According to Judge Brunetti, PCG's purpose to "spread the religious
message of Armstrong's divinely inspired text" required copying of the entire
278. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 441 n.3 1, quoting H. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-66
(1976)) (alterations in original).
279. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 1123 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
281. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
282. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
283. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
284. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
285. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
286. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
287. ld. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
288. See id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (arguing that MOA "defies easy classification under the second factor
as either informational or creative").
289. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50).
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text.290 Thus, the dissent concluded that neither the second nor third statutory factor
weighed against a finding of fair use.291
292Judge Brunetti, too, gave his longest discussion to the fourth statutory factor.
Believing it the most important factor, he began with the proviso that although
PCG's use may be "primarily noncommercial and religious," such use could not be
fair use if it "impaired the value or marketability" of either the original MOA or an
annotation.293
With this in mind, Judge Brunetti first addressed this issue with regard to MOA
in its original form. He asserted that WCG had initially used MOA as an evangelical
tool and for educational purposes by distributing it free, just as PCG had done, and
as such may have received an "indirect financial benefit by attracting tithing
members. 294 However, by keeping MOA intentionally out of circulation for ten
years by destroying the inventory copies and disavowing the religious message of
MOA, Judge Brunetti concluded that, "regardless of PCG's actions," WCG has
demonstrated that MOA is no longer of value to it for those religious purposes. 95
Furthermore, because WCG had no plans to publish or distribute the original version
of MOA, the dissent reasoned that PCG's use would not interfere with any market.296
As for the proposed annotation, the dissent concluded that WCG had failed to
show any meaningful likelihood of future harm.297 Judge Brunetti looked to
Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell,'9 8 where the Second Circuit found that an anti-
abortion book containing quotations from a book favoring abortion did not harm
plans for a second edition of the original, since it was unlikely that potential
customers for a work favorable to abortion would abate their requests for the second
edition because some of the work was in an anti-abortion document.299 Analogizing
Maxtone-Graham, the dissent reasoned that the "functions served by MOA and the
proposed annotation as well as their potential markets are different. ' '300 While PCG
would continue to use MOA for its evangelical purpose, WCG would use an
annotated version to point out the flaws in Armstrong's teachings.3°' Judge Brunetti
wrote that it would "not make sense" for WCG to pursue wide distribution of the
290. Id. at 1]23-24 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
291. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
292. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
293. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
294. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 1124 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
296. See id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[b]ecause WCG has admitted that it has no plans to
publish or distribute MOA as originally written, there can be no market interference").
297. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (referring to Sony, 464 U.S. at 451).
298. 803 F.2d 1253.
299. See Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1124 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (citing Maxtone-Graham, 803
F.2d at 1264).
300. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
301. See id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "central purpose" behind WCG's annotation was to
point out Armstrong's "historical, doctrinal, and social errors").
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annotation to the general public to recruit new members, since the annotated version
would require the reader to already be familiar with Armstrong's teachings in order
to understand WCG's doctrines.3 °2 Moreover, the dissent believed that PCG's
distribution of the original MOA would in fact increase rather than interfere with the
market for the annotation, since PCG would create a wider familiarity with
Armstrong's teachings, which WCG would hope to target with the annotation.3"3
Judge Brunetti further cast doubt as to the sincerity of WCG's intent to publish any
annotation in the future at all since it had made no "reasonable progress" toward
publication in a decade. Judge Brunetti also relied on WCG's declaration of its
"Christian duty" to keep Armstrong's teachings out of circulation. 304 The dissent
therefore believed the fourth statutory factor pointed toward fair use on PCG's
part.
30 5
The dissent also considered WCG's intent in enforcing its copyright. Judge
Brunetti felt that WCG seemed "less interested in protecting its rights to exploit
MOA than in suppressing Armstrong's ideas which now run counter to church
doctrine. ' '306 Noting that the Supreme Court has recognized that freedom of
expression includes the right not to speak, Judge Brunetti also noted that the
Supreme Court acknowledges that this right does not allow a copyright owner to
abuse his copyright to suppress facts.30 7 With this final observation, in addition to
his findings under section 107, Judge Brunetti concluded that the district court was
correct in determining that PCG's secondary use was a statutorily protected fair use
of WCG's MOA.
301
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE WORLDWIDE CHURCH OF GOD DECISION
The fundamental tenet of copyright law, its utilitarian goal, must be kept at the
forefront of any fair use analysis. 3°9 To find a fair use, the use must be "of a
character that serves the copyright objective of stimulating productive thought and
public instruction without excessively diminishing the incentives for creativity.
310
Keeping the utilitarian objective in constant mind, PCG's use of MOA, under the
circumstances presented, clearly did not excessively diminish WCG's incentive to
302. See id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (arguing that the annotation is unlike a "straight-forward" explanation
of doctrine, and requires the potential reader to already be familiar with the original MOA).
303. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
304. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 1125 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
306. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 1118 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559).
308. See id. at 1125 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
309. Budde, supra note 7 1, at 2024; see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 (asserting that fair use is to be applied "in
light of the purposes of copyright"); Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1110 (arguing that "every issue in
a fair use evaluation must be analyzed with the overall purpose of copyright in mind"); supra Part I.A (discussing
the underlying goals of copyright law and the means 'employed to achieve it).
310. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1110.
1131
2001 /Mystery of the Ages: Applying Fair Use
create, and in fact furthered the public goals of education and dissemination. As
such, Judge Brunetti and the district court reached the correct result in concluding
that PCG's use of MOA was a statutory fair use of that work.
A. Preliminary Considerations
Justice O'Connor's statement that a "fair use analysis must always be tailored
to the individual case,"31' implicates the additional circumstances a court may
evaluate apart from the statutory factors.31 2 The Ninth Circuit panel did address
some preliminary considerations before applying section 107 but, unlike the dissent,
failed to display a common-sense evaluation of the equities and facts of the case
before examining the statutory factors.
1. A Harmed Public Interest
One fact the panel did not consider was WCG's purpose in possessing the
copyrights to MOA. Such an evaluation reveals that the public interest in the creation
and dissemination of works is unduly prevented by disallowing PCG's secondary
use. As discussed earlier, because comment and criticism are considered to be
traditional uses that contribute to the utilitarian goal, section 107 and case law favor
these secondary uses.3 13 WCG was clear about its position regarding MOA in its
original form. It saw Armstrong's views as "ecclesiastical error" and "hoped to
prevent a transgression of conscience" by removing the work from distribution.31 4
If the facts were such that WCG did not own the copyrights to MOA, and MOA
continued to be produced and distributed after WCG's views of it reversed, WCG
likely would have openly criticized or commented on the contents of MOA.
Likewise WCG would have probably employed written forms as one mode of this
criticism or comment, forms including portions of MOA. Such uses of MOA are
encouraged by the fair use doctrine, and by copyright law in general, as the public
pool of knowledge is increased.315 WCG, however, has not been forced to pursue
this route. Instead of creating a secondary work, WCG exercised its criticism and
comment of MOA by possession of the copyright and subsequent stowing away of
the book. In effect, it has privatized a previously public work. Such a design
conflicts with the basic purpose of copyright law, to contribute to the public store
of knowledge and subsequent dissemination of works .3 16 Had this court recognized
311. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552.
312. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (illustrating that courts may consider factors apart from
the statutory factors in section 107).
313. Supra note 46 and accompanying text.
314. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1113.
315. Supra Part II.B. 1
316. See supra Part II.A (illustrating the goals of copyright law).
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the damage to the public interest and weighed it accordingly, the court's final fair
use determination may have differed significantly.
317
2. No Damage to Incentive to Create
Likewise, it is difficult to argue that PCG's use of MOA damaged WCG's
incentive to create works. When a copyright holder disavows an interest to exploit
the copyrights, subsequent use of that copyright by a third party cannot be said to
damage the copyright holder's incentives to create. 318 Here, Herbert Armstrong
authored MOA.319 WCG then used it to evangelize in the Christian community and
attract church membership.32° Changing its position, WCG neither produced nor
distributed further copies of MOA in the following ten years.32' As the work was
counter to church doctrine with outdated views, WCG's hope was to produce an
annotated version of MOA in the future.322 At the time the court heard the case,
however, WCG had no plans to produce another version.323 As illustrated in Part
IV.B.4.b, WCG has essentially disavowed any interest in MOA's original form.324
Therefore, since WCG hopes to "prevent a transgression of conscience by
proclaiming what the Church consider[s] to be ecclesiastical error, '325 further
reproduction and distribution of the original MOA did not damage WCG's incentive
to create. Absent is any interest in reproducing the original MOA, and without a
present or future intent to exploit that copyright, WCG's incentive to create is not
damaged. Moreover, continued dissemination of the original MOA would only
increase WCG's incentives to further its "Christian duty" 326 and produce its planned
annotation. Again, because control of the copyright in the original version assures
WCG that no new copies of the work will replenish the public stock, WCG has a
diminished incentive to create a work that it considers to be the truth.
317. See Rosemont, 366 F.2d 303, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (providing an example of a court
weighing the public interest against the potential damage to the copyright owner).
318. Judge Brunetti forwards a related argument in his dissent, positing that under the fourth section 107
factor, Mystery ofAges in its original form had no value to WCG. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1124
(Brunetti, J., dissenting).
319. Id. at 1113.
320. See id. at 1117-19 (discussing these purposes for evaluating the first and fourth section 107 factors).
321. Id. at 1122 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
322. Id. at 1119.
323. Id. at 1113.
324. Infra Part IV.B.4.b.
325. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 113.
326. Judge Brunetti notes that WCG explained that its position to keep MOA away was partially based on a
"Christian duty." Id. at 1122 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
1133
2001/ Mystery of the Ages. Applying Fair Use
3. No Real Interest in Privacy
Finally, the court should have heavily discounted any right to keep works
private based on copyright control. Under the facts, WCG's apparent principal
purpose in enforcing its copyrights is to keep MOA from the public eye.327 Such a
case presents a hard argument for a narrow interpretation of fair use.328 The majority
cited both Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises329 and Salinger v.
Random House, Inc. 330 for the proposition that free speech considerations in
copyright accord a right not to speak as well as the right to speak.33' However, in
both of those cases, neither of the original works was published at the time of the
defendant's secondary use,332 and the emphasis on the right to control expression
through copyright must inevitably be viewed with that context in mind. Here there
is no such concern. MOA had already been circulated in millions of copies.333
The current facts are much closer to those in Rosemont Enterprises v. Random
House, Inc.334 There Howard Hughes formed a corporation which bought the
copyrights to three, ten-year old magazine articles that were going to be used in a
biography about him. 3 5 He opposed their use and his corporation sued for
infringement. 36 Analyzing the defendant's fair use claim, the Second Circuit
reasoned that the public interest in knowing about a prominent figure who entered
the public arena outweighed the interest of Hughes in his privacy.337 Chief Judge
Lumbard, joined by Judge Hays of the three-judge panel, concurred. Judge Lumbard
believed it likely that Hughes's corporation was created mainly to suppress the
biography, and stated:
It has never been the purpose of the copyright laws to restrict the
dissemination of information about persons in the public eye even though
those concerned may not welcome the resulting publicity. It is the purpose
of those laws to give reasonable protection to the product of an author and
327. See id. at 1122-23, 1125 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (discussing WCG's position regarding MOA); id. at
1113 (illustrating WCG's reasons for discontinuing production and distribution of MOA).
328. See Dratler, supra note 46, at 250 (arguing that in Rosemont, 366 F2d at 306 (2d. Cir. 1966), since
Howard Hughes' apparent intent for enforcing his copyright was to prevent further publication of a biography that
had been published for ten years, the incentives for creativity did not require narrowly interpreting fair use).
329. 471 U.S. 539.
330. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 95.
331. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1116.
332. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554 (arguing that an author's right to choose a time for publishing her
work deserves no less protection under the copyright statute); Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97 (noting that the unpublished
works generally receive "complete protection" against copying). The emphasis in Harper & Row on the right to first
publication came from a number of considerations, including preparation costs. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554.
333. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F3d at 1113.
334. Rosemont, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
335. See id. at 304-07 (detailing the facts of the case).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 309.
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his manner of expression where the author's proper interest in the product
might suffer thereby. It would be contrary to the public interest to permit
any man to buy up the copyright to anything written about himself and to
use his copyright ownership to restrain others from publishing biographical
material concerning him.338
The Harper & Row court expressed a similar view, noting that the right to refrain
from speaking does not "sanction abuse of the copyright owner's monopoly as an
instrument to suppress facts. 339 Unlike the Rosemont corporation, WCG did not buy
the copyrights to MOA in order to acquire control. Rather, the copyright passed
innocently by will,340 and it was not until a few years after Armstrong's death that
WCG changed its position and ceased its production. 34' Nevertheless, WCG's good
fortune in acquiring the rights to MOA does not affect the state of facts as they
existed at the time the case was before the court. WCG believed that continued
distribution of Armstrong's work would perpetuate ecclesiastical error,342 and it was
its "Christian duty" to prevent that.343 WCG's reasons for ceasing publication and
distribution, as well as the ten-year period that has passed with no plans to create an
annotated version of MOA, 34 indicate strongly that WCG's interest in MOA is
continued suppression of the information conveyed through Herbert Armstrong's
writings, rather than protecting its own incentive to create. Keeping in mind the
likely damage to the public interest, the lack of damage to WCG's incentive to
create, and WCG's questionable use of its copyright monopoly, the court should
have addressed the statutory factors.
B. Assessing the Statutory Factors
1. Justified Copying and Distribution of Mystery of the Ages
Though effect on the potential market is often labeled the most important
factor,345 perhaps most important of late has been the first factor. In fact, decisions
coming after Campbell suggest that the first statutory factor has become dispositive
338. Id. at 311 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring).
339. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559.
340. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1114-15.
341. Id. at 1113.
342. Id. at 1119.
343. See id. at 1122 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (noting WCG's perceived duty "to keep Armstrong's doctrinal
errors out of circulation").
344. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting); id. at It 13.
345. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing the importance attributed by courts to the first
factor).
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in a fair use analysis.346 Nearly every one of the determinations regarding the court's
ultimate conclusion on fair use has mirrored the court's conclusion reached under
the first factor. Again, though the factors need not be given equal weight, all must
be considered nonetheless.347 If the first factor has indeed attained such dispositive
weight among courts, all the more reason exists for a court to give a full and detailed
analysis when coming to a conclusion about the secondary user's purpose. That is
precisely what the circuit courts majority failed to do in Worldwide Church of God.
The majority was clear that it believed the first statutory factor weighed against
PCG in all respects. It found PCG's use of MOA simply to be a superseding use of
the original under Justice Story's language, lacking any transformative or productive
use.348 It also discounted PCG's claims of noncommercial, nonprofit use, adopting
a broadened view of the "profit" concept.349 With that, the majority implied that
PCG's use of MOA was more akin to a traditional, commercial use for profit, rather
than a nonprofit use. 350 Hence, the facts tilted the analysis against PCG.
Unfortunately, the majority's analysis is flawed in a number of ways.
a. PCG's Religious Purposes
After Campbell, there is now no question that the presence of a productive use
is a consideration under the first statutory factor, indeed it is the "central purpose"
of the first prong inquiry.35' But, the majority's consideration fell short of a full
analysis. Quoting Campbell's language framing the transformative use inquiry, the
majority concluded that PCG's use merely superseded the purposes of WCG's use,
that is, to "serve religious practice and education." '352 "[N]o intellectual labor andjudgment" was thus evidenced by copying MOA in its entirety,"' and therefore such
a non-transformative use favored WCG.354 The panel's reasoning, however, suffers
from two mistakes. First, the panel gave undue importance to the productive use
346. See Jeremy Kudon, Note, Form over Function: Expanding the Transformative Use Test For Fair Use,
80 B.U. L. REv. 579, 583 (2000) (discovering that in the approximately thirty-eight fair use decisions published by
the federal courts since Campbell, the determination of fair use corresponded in all but one case to the finding
regarding transformative use). Kudon also argues that the results of this survey suggest that the transformative use
test "could be labeled a presumptively dispositive factor." Id.; see also Lape, supra note 63, at 712 (noting that,
since Sony, the weight attributed to productive use has increased).
347. See supra notes 97 to 104 and accompanying text (discussing proper application of section 107).
348. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1117.
349. Id. at 1118-19; see infra Part IV.B.l.b (analyzing the majority's discussion of PCG's "profit" gained).
350. See infra Part IV.B.I.b (analyzing the majority's reasoning in dismissing PCG's claim of non-
commercial use).
351. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
352. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1117.
353. Id. 1117.
354. Id. The majority asserted that "where the 'use is for the same intrinsic purpose as [the copyright holder's]
... such use seriously weakens a claimed fair use."' Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1117 (quoting
Weissman, 868 F.2d at 1324) (alteration in original).
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requirement. Second, the panel erred by limiting its view of what secondary uses
may indeed be considered productive or transformative uses.
First, the majority overly narrowed the purpose prong of the first factor by
focusing solely on a transformative use requirement for PCG' s uses in education and
religious practice. The majority did not discuss purposes for PCG's use under any
other criteria apart from a transformative or productive character. Though the
majority recognized Campbell's statement that a productive use is not "absolutely
necessary," '355 it tempered this concession by writing that the absence of a
transformative use "seriously weakens a claimed fair use. ' 35 6 It reasoned, borrowing
some of Justice Story's other language in Folsom, that mere wholesale copying
cannot be found to transform the work sufficiently to lean toward fair use. 357 The
import of the majority's reasoning, thus, is that a productive/transformative use is
indeed a requirement under the purpose prong of the first statutory factor,
notwithstanding Campbell's admonition to the contrary. Hence, the court proceeded
from an inaccurate, or at least an incomplete, premise.
Sole reliance on productive use is subject to criticism.358 Requiring productive
or transformative uses presents the danger that the first factor inquiry will be unduly
narrowed. 359 By looking to productivity as an end in itself, the value in the exchange
of ideas is discounted.36 Copyright's goal of enlightening the public through the
dissemination of works of authorship is forgotten. 36' Furthermore,
transformative/productive use, when equated with a nonsuperseding use, brings the
fourth factor analysis concerning potential market displacement into the first factor
analysis. In turn, this permits the fourth factor to be counted a second time, and
prevents the first factor from being counted at all.362
Rather than solely transformative/productive use under Campbell, a more
encompassing social beneficial use is the primary inquiry under the first factor.363
The foremost support for this comes from section 107 itself. Again, the uses listed
in the preamble, such as criticism and comment, have been considered traditional
productive uses of the type that fair use favors. 364 However, this list was also
expressly illustrative, intending "to suggest a larger class of uses that serve the
public interest. 3 65 There is no better example illustrating this truth than the
355. Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
356. Id. (quoting Weissman, 868 F.2d at 1324).
357. See id. (arguing that "PCG's copying of WCG's MOA in its entirety bespeaks no 'intellectual labor and
judgment[,]" [and] ... merely "supersedes the object" of the original").
358. See Lape, supra note 63, at 724 (arguing that the productive use doctrine should be abandoned,
"stand[ing] in the way of sensible application of fair use").
359. Id. at 713.
360. Id. at 712-13.
361. See id. at 712.
362. Id. at 722.
363. Id.
364. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the preamble list).
365. Lape, supra note 63, at 713.
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preamble's express inclusion of multiple copies for classroom use, a use that is
nothing more than mere reproductions of originals. In the case law, the prime
example is Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,366 where the
Supreme Court approved of wholesale copying of television programs for purposes
of merely altering viewing times. Though of course this use fails to transform the
original, it can certainly be deemed a socially beneficial use by allowing the
dissemination of works through increased opportunities for viewing. Requiring
transformative/productive use has the ultimate effect of narrowing the first factor,
thereby excluding consideration of uses that have social utility.367
The majority erred in not recognizing that broader beneficial uses of works may
serve as criteria from which to characterize a secondary use. Educational use
through teaching is a purpose clearly recognized by section 107 in the preamble.368
The panel indeed labeled PCG's copying and distribution as for religious practice
and education. 369 However, the discussion ended there. The majority ceased further
discussion about any educational purpose and benefit of PCG's use of MOA.
Instead, the panel merely attached these labels to PCG's activity, but then framed
the inquiry solely in transformative/productive use terms. It thus ignored any
socially beneficial use of MOA by PCG apart from any transformative/productive
use.
Assuming the majority correctly emphasized the requirement of
transformative/productive use, the majority too narrowly applied it and should have
found that PCG's mere copying and distributing actually was a transformative or
productive use of the original MOA. Employing Justice Story's language that
"intellectual labor and judgment [must be] bestowed" on the secondary use and not
display "merely the facile use of the scissors, 37 ° the majority implied that simple
reproduction is not a productive or transformative use of an original copyrighted
work. The panel's conclusion is not surprising since in the decisions that have
followed Campbell, only secondary uses that added expression constituting clear
criticism, commentary, or scholarship have generally been found to be
transformative uses.37'
366. 464 U.S. 417.
367. Lape, supra note 63, at 714.
368. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
369. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1117.
370. Id. (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)).
371. See Kudon, supra note 337, at 583 (concluding that a review of thirty-eight post-Campbell decisions
suggests that only this category of uses generally pass this test). Kudon further concluded that the post-Campbell
decisions have produced two other categories of works: (1) mere reproductions, (2) works that add expression to
the original, but "not in the form of criticism, commentary or scholarship." Id. These categories, unlike those uses
that add expression in the form of commentary, criticism, or scholarship, are not usually found to be transformative
uses. Id. See id. at 605-06 (arguing "that the transformative uke test has effectively foreclosed the fair use defense
for those secondary works falling within either of the first two categories").
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However, the definition of transformative/productive use has by no means been
uniform.372 For a secondary use to be productive, it need not necessarily add
something that was not previously in the original. Another way to determine
whether a use is transformative/productive is to compare the functions served by
both the original and secondary work. A "function" test to determine whether a use
is transformative or productive has basis in the law.373 As one commentator has
noted, "if the transformative use test truly reflects copyright's utilitarian objectives,
it should not be restricted solely to works that add creative value ... [but should]
include an analysis of the function or purpose that the two works serve. 374 As a
result, mere reproductions of original works may certainly be transformative,
especially where the secondary use serves a different function than the original.375
Whether the secondary use supersedes the original is a function of how close the
respective functions that both uses serve.376
An analysis of the majority's productive/transformative use analysis reveals that
both its analysis and conclusion are inaccurate. Again, PCG used MOA, according
to the majority, to "serve religious practice and education," which was for the same
purpose as that of the original MOA.377 Originally, MOA was intended and used for
the same purposes as PCG's later use. However, the majority should not have
compared PCG' s current purpose to MOA' s original purpose. Instead, the secondary
use should have been compared to the current purpose of the original work. The
panel appeared to recognize this, noting that a secondary use that is for the "same
intrinsic purpose" as the copyright holder leans away from a fair use.3 78 What must
be remembered is that the copyright holder in a work may change over time, and
each holder may have different intentions for possessing a copyright. WCG's
purpose for MOA at the time of trial was clear. Feeling its "Christian duty" to keep
Herbert Armstrong's views from the public,379 WCG ended production and
372. Lape, supra note 63, at 712.
373. See Dratler, supra note 46, at 323 (noting that support for a functional test exists in both case law and,
though of a limited nature, in the legislative history of the copyright statute); see also Kudon, supra note 337, at
608 (arguing that a proposal for a function analysis does not expand the fair use doctrine, but merely gives
recognition to an additional factor in the transformative use analysis that courts have already used both expressly
and implicitly). But see Dratler, supra note 46, at 323 n.481 (suggesting that the reasoning of courts applying the
functionality test to the first statutory factor is better suited to the market effect factor).
374. Kudon, supra note 337, at 606.
375. See id. at 597 (arguing that it is "unduly restrictive" to classify all mere reproductions of original works
as non-transformative, particularly where the secondary use is for a different purpose other than that of the author);
see also Anderson et al., supra note 45, at 42 (noting that comparison of the relative uses of the original and
secondary work is relevant under the first statutory factor). But see Dratler, supra note 46, at 324 (suggesting that
there is no basis in the statute for assessing the relative purposes of the original and secondary work, but only the
absolute use of the secondary work).
376. Kudon, supra note 337, at 606.
377. Worldwide Church ofGod, 227 F.3d at 1117.
378. Id. (quoting Weissman, 868 F.2d at 1324).
379. Id. at 1122 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
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distribution of MOA, destroying almost all of the copies in its possession." 8 As the
dissent believed, and as discussed supra,381 the evidence indicates that WCG's
purpose for possessing Armstrong's work of authorship was to keep it out of view
to suppress the work. Rather than exploiting the benefits of owning its copyrights,
WCG used the inherent control arising from its bundle of rights to prevent further
dissemination of the MOA. PCG's active utilization of MOA, both through copying
and distribution for religious practice and education, does indeed functionally
transform WCG's purpose of secreting away the expression. By not understanding
that transformative/productive use is a much broader concept than mere alteration
or addition to the original work, the court incorrectly characterized PCG's use of
MOA, a use that was functionally a transformative/productive use of MOA.
b. The Majority's Unworkable "Profit" Consideration
The majority's flawed first factor analysis continued when considering PCG's
claim that its use of MOA was not commercial and not-for-profit. This portion of the
inquiry is perhaps more flawed than its productive use analysis. At the outset, the
court mistakenly indicated that secondary uses other than noncommercial uses are
presumptively unfair. Supporting this idea and thereby compounding this erroneous
presumption, the panel embraced the notion that a for-profit use that fails to
remunerate the copyright holder is not fair. Operating from this mistaken premise,
the court committed its final error by adopting an unworkable definition of "profit"
in an apparent attempt to liken PCG's use of MOA to that of a traditional for-profit
operation. Stating that PCG "unquestionably" profited from its use in various ways,
the court concluded that these facts further disfavored fair use under the first
factor.3
81
First, the court mistakenly treated this part of the first factor inquiry as having
a presumptive effect. The majority was initially correct, recognizing the Supreme
Court's admonition that commercial or nonprofit educational use is only one aspect
of a larger inquiry into the purposes for the secondary use of the work.383 The panel
further illustrated this subtle relationship by suggesting that a commercial use
merely "tends to weigh against fair use. 384 However, immediately thereafter the
court made a contrary assertion, stating that the absence of commercial use in a
given case would only have the effect of removing a "presumption of unfairness. ' 385
The import of this statement is that the court actually did view uses other than non-
commercial uses as giving rise to a presumption of unfairness. The problem with
380. Id. at 1113.
381. Supra Part IV.A.3.
382. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1118.
383. Id. at 1117 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994)).
384. Id.
385. Id. (emphasis added).
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this assertion is that the law states the contrary. The Supreme Court was clear in
Campbell that commercial secondary use carries with it no presumption of
unfairness. 386 Any nonprofit or commercial uses are merely factors to be evaluated
among the others.387
Second, the court adopted the notion that uncompensated commercial uses are
especially disfavored, or at least add to a presumption of unfairness. Included in the
majority's rule statements is Harper & Row's exclamation that "[t]he crux of the
profit/non-profit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary
gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted
material without paying the customary price. 388 The court explicitly embraced this
idea in its reasoning, stating that PCG enjoyed the use of MOA "without having to
account to the copyright holder., 389 Reliance on such an idea is problematic,
however. The argument is inherently circular by referring to a failure to pay a
"customary price. '390 "By definition, if the defendant's use is fair, no fee, customary
or not, is due."39 1 Such a statement runs the risk of distracting a court from a broader
focus on the overall secondary purpose. Hence, the court analyzed the nature of
PCG's use from a premise that tended to unduly prejudice its use as presumptively
unfair if labeled as a commercial use.
Unpersuaded by PCG's claim of nonprofit use, the majority delved into an
analysis of what uses apart from "dollar" uses could actually be deemed for
"profit. 392 In the end, the majority embraced a broad definition of "profit. 393 Not
confined to the mere want of pecuniary gain, the panel stated that PCG
"unquestionably" profited in three ways using MOA: by providing to its constituents
the essential text of MOA necessary for religious practice at no cost, by attracting
new membership through distribution, and by allowing the ministry to expand.394
Certainly particular situations, where "profit" is not amenable to a dollar
measurement, call for criteria apart from the mere pursuit of monetary gain to
determine if a use is for "profit." However, the majority here provided no in-depth
analysis. Citing the dictionary definition of "profit" as meaning either an
"advantage" or "benefit, ' 395 the court reasoned that "it is beyond dispute that PCG
'profited' from copying MOA-it gained an 'advantage' or 'benefit' from its
distribution and use of MOA. 396 The problem with the court's reasoning is that it
386. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (arguing that neither the case law nor Congress intended a commercial
use presumption against fair use).
387. Id. at 585.
388. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562).
389. Id. at 1118.
390. Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 684.
391. Id.
392. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1118.
393. Id.
394. Id. It is unclear to the author how the majority's second reason differs from the third.
395. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1811 (3d ed. 1971).
396. Id.
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does not appear to have any bounds. It would be hard to imagine a situation where
a court would not be able to find for "profit" use, finding neither a benefit nor
advantage gained by the secondary user. Since a court following the panel's
reasoning can liken any use to a traditional commercial use by finding "profit"
through an advantage or benefit gained, any distinction between a nonprofit use and
for profit use is rendered ineffective. A plausible result given the breadth of the
court's statement, was articulated by Judge Whyte in Religious Technology Center
v. Netcom On-Line Services, Inc.3 97 He suggested that allowing some "personal
profit" outside of traditional dollar profit to defeat a noncommercial use would result
in the discouragement of many otherwise fair uses.3 98
Rather, PCG's use is better characterized as that of a nonprofit educational use.
Nonprofit educational use is listed in opposition to commercial use in section 107,
and educational use is exactly what the majority attributed to PCG's activity. 399 This
use was furthermore non-profit and non-commercial. PCG distributed MOA free of
charge, solicited no funds in connection with its distribution, and any funds donated
in connection with MOA's distribution did not even support printing costs.4°° As the
dissent pointed out, PCG's use is clearly distinguishable from other cases where the
secondary use was labeled commercial; in all of those cases the secondary use was
clearly for "dollar" profit.4°' In light of this, PCG's use can hardly be labeled as
traditionally "commercial."
Concerning broader for "profit" uses, the majority loosely analogized Weissman
v. Freeman,4 °2 where a professor was not entitled to fair use of a journal article he
copied in its entirety for distribution in connection with a course he was to teach,
naming himself as the author. °3 Though the majority may be correct in asserting
that religion, like academia, is not dollar dominated, thereby justifying other "profit"
criteria,4 °4 Weissman is clearly distinguishable. There, the Second Circuit found that
the defendant profited because he "stood to gain recognition among his peers in the
profession and authorship credit," and that what "is valuable is recognition because
it so often influences professional advancement and academic tenure." 405 The court's
language reveals a concern for the defendant's position to primarily bring accolades
upon himself through his use of the plaintiff's work. PCG's use stands in contrast.
PCG's purpose in using MOA is to educate and evangelize. 46 PCG believed in the
397. 923 F.Supp. 1231 (1995).
398. See id. at 1244 (arguing that "[i]f mere recognition by one's peers constituted 'personal profit' to defeat
a finding of a noncommercial use, courts would seldom find any criticism fair use and much valuable criticism
would be discouraged").
399. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1117.
400. Id. at 1122-23 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
401. Id. at 1123 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (citing cases where the secondary use was clearly commercial).
402. 868 F2d 1313.
403. Id. at 1316.
404. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1118.
405. Weissman, 868 F2d at 1324.
406. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1119.
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divine inspiration for Armstrong's writings-that his work was necessary for proper
interpretation of the Bible.4 °7 That PCG sought to spread the truth through
Armstrong's words, though simultaneously attracting tithing church members, does
not reflect the same intent to primarily reap a personal "profit" that existed in
Weissman. Thus, in the circumstances here, the noncommercial or nonprofit
elements for educational purposes overwhelm any for "profit" use and, in light of
PCG's undisputed educational use of MOA, the first factor leans toward PCG.
2. The True Nature of Mystery of the Ages
The panel's treatment of the second factor is as troublesome as its analysis of
PCG's purpose for its use-its reasoning consisted of a total of two sentences. The
majority stated that the second statutory factor turns simply on whether a work is
either creative or informational, and that MOA' s creative elements tilted the analysis
in favor of WCG. While a court's to engage in an in-depth analysis of a statutory
factor is not unheard of,408 the peculiar facts surrounding the particular character of
MOA demanded a much deeper analysis.
a. Primarily a Factual Work
First, the panel too hastily labeled MOA as a predominately creative work. The
court reasoned that although readers who share Armstrong's views may deem MOA
as factual, the "creativity, imagination and originality" of the work dominated,
placing the work more at the creative end of the spectrum and favoring WCG. 409 At
the same time, however, the majority did not reject PCG's claim that MOA was a
textual, historical account of Armstrong's views of the Bible. It merely implied that
Armstrong's creative input overshadowed any factual essence. The court should
have avoided such a curtailed analysis, however, as even nonfiction works,
including mere compilations of facts, contain authorial originality. 410 Bare
recognition of the inclusion of creativity and a bald conclusion of its prevalence in
a disputed work does little for the analysis.
MOA in particular requires a more in-depth analysis because of the religious
heart. There is no dispute that MOA is indeed a religious work. The dissent describes
MOA in precisely this term,41' and the majority implies it repeatedly through its
reasoning.412 As the dissent illustrated, religious works do not lend themselves to
407. Id. at 1122 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
408. See Triangle Publ'ns, 626 F.2d at 1176 & n. 14 (concluding with essentially no analysis that the second
statutory factor neither hurt nor helped the defendant's claim of fair use and was "not important" to the case).
409. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1118.
410. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 547.
411. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1123 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
412. See id. passim (referring to the evangelical uses both churches had for MOA and the work's religious
content).
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easy classification.4 3 Courts before have recognized this trouble when faced with
the works of L. Ron Hubbard, reaching varying conclusions on how to properly treat
such works under the second statutory factor. In New Era Publications,
International v. Carol Publishing Group,1 4 the Second Circuit reviewed some of
Hubbard's works that, similar to MOA, purported to reflect the author's views on
religion. The court believed that, though it had "some hesitation" in trying to place
a religious work in a particular classification, the work "on balance" was "more
properly viewed as factual or informational. '4 5 Likewise, in Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom On-Line Corn. Services, Inc.,416 the district court found that
Hubbard's works of religious philosophy, "although creative, are primarily
functional or instructive. 4t 7 Coming to the opposite conclusion, the district court in
Bridge Publications, Inc. v. Vien4 18 stated that "Hubbard's works [were] the product
of his creative thought process, and not merely informational.,, 4 '9 Even the overall
wisdom of attempting classification has been questioned. Though ultimately making
a classification, the Religious Technology Center court also noted that it was
unconvinced that the second factor should play a significant role in questions
regarding religious works, since they "do not easily fit into the creative/information
dichotomy., 420 Judge Brunetti reached a similar conclusion in Worldwide Church
of God, asserting that the factor was mainly irrelevant to the analysis because of the
difficulty of classification.421
Though there is no consensus regarding religious works, the better conclusion
under the facts of this case is that MOA should indeed be placed on the
informational or factual end of the spectrum, rather than on the creative end. Factual
works are those whose primary purpose is to convey information, with the manner
of expression being a subordinate concern.422 Armstrong's religious views in MOA
touched a variety of doctrines. Both the majority and dissent referred to the religious
purposes MOA had served at one time for both churches: it was an evangelical tool
used to garner church membership.423 As such a device, MOA's purpose is to spread
and further the church doctrines contained within the work. MOA's value is thus
derived from its ability to convey Armstrong's doctrines to its readers, that is, to
convey religious truths. In other words, MOA is informational. For the majority to
say that the factual nature of MOA is undercut, because only readers who share
413. Id. at 1123 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
414. 904 F.2d 152.
415. Id. at 157.
416. 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
417. Id. at 1246.
418. 827 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
419. Id. at 635-36.
420. Religious Tech. Ctr., 923 F.Supp. at 1246.
421. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1123 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
422. Dratler, supra note 46, at 242.
423. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1117-20; id. at 1122-25 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
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Armstrong's views may view the book as factual,424 is a mistake. WCG's reasons
for ceasing distribution centered around its belief in the doctrinal incorrectness of
the book-its ecclesiastical errors.425 Put another way, WCG opposed Armstrong's
work because it believed that MOA's "truths" were in fact fallacies. Thus, even
readers who did not share Armstrong's views would still see the work as a "factual"
work, though an incorrect one. One only need to consider the Bible as an analog.
Though undisputably containing flowery expression from cover to cover, the Bible
at its core is valued for its ability to communicate factual truths, and is in turn
criticized for its untruths. Thus, the expression attached to MOA is subsidiary to its
core of containing factual truths or falsehoods. By this, MOA is a better fit in the
informational category.
426
Moreover, even if one concedes at first glance that MOA is primarily a creative
work, a closer look at Armstrong's expressive aspects nevertheless supports its
characterization as primarily a factual or informational work. Consideration of
Armstrong's expression as fact in and of itself addresses this issue and is something
neither the majority nor the dissent addressed. Biographies and other historical
works provide the familiar examples where use of another's expression has its value
as the factual material contained in the secondary work. For example, quotation of
a subject's expression can be an important method for conveying accurate attributes
of a person.427 In this sense, the expression derives its value as a fact, not from its
creativity. In such a case, a court should determine whether the "particular manner
of expression.., is itself a fact, due to the significance or timing of the work or the
expression, the nature and purpose of the work, or simply the importance of the
author., 428 Though PCG's use of MOA is not a conventional biography or history
book, a similar analysis is appropriate. Herbert Armstrong was WCG's "undisputed
spiritual and temporal leader" until his death.429 He had written thousands of articles
for the church's magazine over the decades, and over nine million copies of his final
work, MOA, were distributed and used at times by both churches in "evangelizing
in the Christian community." 430 To PCG, MOA was a divinely inspired text,431 while
WCG saw Armstrong's views as ecclesiastical error, removing it from circulation
424. Id. at 1118.
425. Id. at 1119.
426. See Religious Tech. Ctr., 923 F.Supp. at 1246 (finding that copyrighted works of religious philosophy,
"although creative, are primarily functional or instructive").
427. See Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1112-13 (discussing the importance of quotation in
biography). Judge Leval, however, noted that it is especially important in biographies to make a fair use
determination for each passage quoted, and not the work as a whole. Some passages may indeed be fair, while others
may not. Id. at 1112.
428. See Dratler, supra note 46, at 309 (arguing for a second inquiry if a work is facially deemed more
creative than factual).
429. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1113.
430. Id. at 1113.
431. Id. at 1122 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
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to "prevent a transgression of conscience. '432 Given Armstrong's long centrality to
church doctrine and the religious importance of MOA's expression-education and
practice for PCG and a work of doctrinal error to WCG-Armstrong' s expression
in MOA is better labeled as fact. Consequently, these facts bolster MOA's place on
the factual end of the informational/creative spectrum.
b. The Likely Stimulus for Creation
The panel also unnecessarily limited its analysis to whether MOA was either
predominately creative or informational. Given the admitted religious purposes of
the work, inquiry into the impetus underlying Armstrong's creation of MOA is worth
consideration as well. There is a stronger argument for fair use when copyright
protection is not what motivates an author to write.433 Judge Leval's examples of
such works are the shopping list and the loanshark's note threatening his debtor.434
Having previously written over three thousand other works over the decades,
Armstrong's final work, the 380-page Mystery of the Ages, comprised Armstrong's
views on religious doctrine. 435 The majority itself acknowledged that MOA's
purpose was evangelical, 436 and that the millions of circulated copies were
distributed at no cost to the recipient, either by WCG or PCG.437 WCG even
admitted to the negatives associated with printing and distributing MOA. 438 From
these facts, it appears that MOA was not the type of work from which Armstrong
hoped to benefit by exploiting copyrights.
432. Id. at 1113.
433. See Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1116-17 (drawing distinctions between works intended
for copyright protection and works written for reasons unrelated to the purposes of copyright law); id. at 1119
(stating that the second statutory factor requires a determination into "whether the work is the type of material that
copyright was designed to stimulate"); Budde, supra note 71, at 2026 (arguing that copyright protection is not what
motivates authors of scientific articles to write). Budde further argues that what authors of scientific articles seek
is "renown" and want the "widest possible dissemination and use of their works." Id.
434. Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1116-17. Judge Leval elaborated by stating that when fair
use is involved, there is a difference between works created for private purposes with no purpose of publication and
those creations made in contemplation of publication. To Judge Leval, works of the latter type are less amenable
to fair use. Id. at 1117. However, since judge Leval added that works of the former deserve less protection because
they are written for reasons unrelated to the purposes of copyright, id., there is no reason to rely on whether the work
is intended for publication or not. Certainly one can create a work for the very purpose of publication, with the
hopes that each recipient of that work will then copy it and distribute it further. A author's witty political message
contained in a flyer is a prime example. This is a work that could certainly qualify for copyright protection, but the
author here does not create it for private purposes. Rather, he hopes that his message will reach the largest audience
possible. Exploitation of copyrights were nevertheless the farthest thing from his mind when he wrote down his
message. This work should also be more amenable to fair use since, though not created for private purposes,
copyright was not what drove the creation.
435. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1113.
436. Id. at 1119.
437. Id. at 1113.
438. See id. at 1123 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (noting that one of the reasons WCG ceased publication was
because of the "costly production").
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Rather, MOA's religious nature, having been used from its beginning to spread
a religious message through the words of Herbert Armstrong at no cost, suggests
strongly that MOA was not a work whose creation relied on the incentives created
by copyright law. While the court's opinion demonstrates that MOA had the effect
of increasing church membership, and increasing income to the church,4 3 9 to say that
this end was the motivation that encouraged Herbert Armstrong to put pen to paper
is a giant leap in reasoning. Though admittedly not a mere shopping list or artless
threatening note, MOA nonetheless shares a similarity in that the reasons for creation
among all three works are unrelated to the purposes of copyright law. A religious
work is something which copyright law certainly can encourage, but is normally a
type that, if the work is truly for spreading a religious message, does not need, or
likely expect, the protections of copyright law. In conjunction with the informational
and factual nature of the work, that copyright law is in all likelihood not what
motivated Herbert Armstrong to write, the majority should have determined that the
second factor weigh-in heavier in this analysis, and in favor of PCG.
3. The Amount Congruent with the Justification
Since the majority began with a mistaken premise under the first factor, its
conclusion regarding the amount of MOA that was used by PCG was inevitably
tainted. Noting Campbell's admonition that the amount of copying permissible
varies with the justification for the secondary use,440 it rejected PCG's claim that
verbatim copying was reasonable because of its religious purpose. 44' First the panel
distinguished Campbell's secondary parodic use, stating that PCG was on a
"different footing" because PCG used MOA for the same purpose used by WCG .42
It also distinguished Sony, concluding that the "unique circumstances" there, that is,
videotaping for time-shifted viewing of programs a viewer was already invited to
watch, did not exist under these facts to permit PCG to copy MOA wholesale.443 The
majority thus concluded that a "reasonable person would expect PCG to pay WCG
for the right to copy and distribute MOA created by WCG with its resources."
44
Accepting the religious purposes for MOA, a more thorough analysis reveals that
reproduction of MOA in its entirety was reasonable under these facts.
The majority erred by its comparison with both Sony and Campbell. First, the
majority was wrong to assert that this case was different from Campbell because
there was productive use in Campbell where there was none here; as previously
demonstrated, 445 PCG' s use was in fact a productive use of MOA, as WCG' s purpose
439. See id. at 1118 (noting that PCG's use enabled it to attract tithing members to the church).




444. Id. at 1118-19.
445. See supra Part I.B. l.a (illustrating that PCG's use of MOA was "productive").
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of possessing the copyright was to suppress the work. 46 Second, the majority's
assertion that the absence of unique circumstances like those in Sony failed to justify
wholesale copying is unsound. Since the Supreme Court has since stated that "the
extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use," 447
the majority should have more closely analyzed the facts of this case, rather than
merely state that the case is unlike Sony for lack of similar unique circumstances.
The amount of the original copied is not evaluated "in a vacuum, but [rather] in
relation to the legitimate purpose claimed for the use."" 8 Absent here is analysis of
the simple relationship between the amount PCG used to its justification for using
that amount. The subtle antipathy towards PCG's uncompensated use revealed by
the majority falls short of such an analysis.
Judge Brunetti, although concluding that the third factor was "largely irrelevant"
to the analysis, actually makes a simple, yet strong argument in his dissent for
PCG's verbatim copying of MOA. 449 To him, wholesale copying, remaining
consistent with PCG's religious purposes, did not weigh against fair use.450 Again,
the need to quote an original work verbatim can be very important in the interest of
accuracy. 45' Like revealing key aspects of the subject's character in a biography,
accurate quotation to display a subject's original idea, used secondarily "as a part
of a portrait of the subject," shares a similar importance.452 There is no dispute that
MOA is properly characterized as a religious work, being a central part of PCG's
religious practice and evangelism in the community.453 MOA is required reading for
all who wish to be baptized into PCG, and PCG believes MOA is "a divinely
inspired text necessary for proper interpretation of the Bible. 454 With such a belief
as to the source of Armstrong's ideas and its role in PCG's religious practice, it is
unrealistic to argue that verbatim quotation of those very words is unnecessary to
fulfill PCG's religious purposes. Such a view would be akin to suggesting that one
may only use something short of the entire Bible word-for-word in religious
practice, perhaps a summary of its facts. Such a suggestion would be absurd.
Copying MOA verbatim is thus a reasonable quantity used in relation to the purpose
and character of PCG's use, the precise amount necessary to spread the religious
message contained within it.
446. See supra Part IV.A. I (discussing WCG's primary intent to hide away MOA).
447. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87.
448. Dratler, supra note 46, at 314. Professor Dratler further argues that the first and third statutory factors
are "inextricably related" and hence the third factor cannot be evaluated until the first is resolved. Id.
449. Id.
450. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1123 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
451. See Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 1, at 1113-16 (discussing the importance of using direct
quotation in secondary works).
452. Id. at 1114.
453. See Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d passim (referring to the doctrinal content of MOA and the
religious purposes both churches had for the work).
454. Id. at 1122 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
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As to the qualitative amount of a copyrighted work which is taken, evaluation
of this prong is where Judge Brunetti is correct in stating that the third statutory
factor is largely irrelevant to the analysis. Perhaps recognizing this, neither the
majority nor the dissent analyzed the qualitative aspect of the quantity taken. The
majority did quote the Supreme Court's statement in Harper & Row that "the fact
that a substantial portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim is evidence of
the qualitative value of the copied material, both to the originator and to the
plagiarist who seeks to profit from marketing someone else's copyrighted
expression. 455 However, the majority used this statement in conjunction with its
quantitative assessment, not with a separate qualitative inquiry. 56 Since the entire
work was used, and necessarily so to fulfill PCG's justified secondary use, it would
not be helpful to discuss the "quality and importance" of the selection taken, or
whether PCG took the most exploitable portions of MOA, taking its "heart." Since
MOA was copied verbatim, a qualitative assessment to determine how PCG's MOA
would interfere with WCG' s market would merely duplicate the analysis under the
fourth statutory factor, causing it to be counted twice. Under these facts, a strict
quantitative assessment in relation to PCG's justification is all that is proper, and as
demonstrated, shows that the amount used, though essentially all of the original, is
consistent with PCG's justification for use.
4. No Significant Market Interference
Though the majority saved its longest discussion for the fourth statutory factor,
the lengthier treatment did not reduce its analytical errors. First, the court accepted
the argument that PCG's MOA and WCG's future republication or annotated version
of MOA would both serve the same function as a marketing device. 57 Second, the
majority denied PCG's argument that WCG's ten years of inactivity and its lack of
a definite plan to produce an annotation demonstrated "that MOA has no economic
value to WCG.,,458 Though the majority conceded that the fourth factor was, "at
worst, neutral, 459 applying the particular facts at hand here, in light of the purposes
of copyright, reveals that the dissent had the better reasoned opinion regarding
potential market effect or effect on the value of MOA. That is, the fourth factor does
not weigh against fair use.
At the outset, the majority erred in its conclusion regarding the potential market
displacement of PCG's use of MOA. The majority believed that PCG's version of
MOA, with its value being a marketing device "in evangelizing in the Christian
455. Id. at 1118 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565).
456. Id.
457. Id. at 1119.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 1120.
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community," had the same value to WCG. 460 Both would thus serve identical
functions. 46' A court must be careful, however, in applying a test discussing the
congruence of functionality between the original and secondary work,462 such as the
court did here. The majority inferred market interference because the works served
the same function. "Such reasoning does little more than allow a court to substitute
facile labels for analysis and proof. 46 3 Here, the court did not separate MOA in its
original form from the proposed annotation, providing as a result a muddled
analysis.
a. No Displacement of an Annotation
Regarding any future annotation produced by WCG, there is good reason to
believe that PCG's MOA in original form would not compete with such a work. As
the dissent argued, 46 4 Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchael4 65 provides a framework for
analysis. In Maxtone-Graham, a book opposing abortion used lengthy quotations
from another book that treated abortion favorably. 466 The court held that the
secondary use did not harm the potential market for a later edition of the plaintiff's
work partly because "it [was] unthinkable that potential customers for a series of
sympathetic interviews on abortion ... would withdraw their requests because a
small portion of the work was used in an essay sharply critical of abortion. 467 That
position was bolstered by the court's finding that both the original and the secondary
work "served fundamentally different functions, by virtue both of their opposing
viewpoints and disparate editorial formats. '468 As Judge Brunetti pointed out, PCG's
evangelical use would stand in contrast to WCG's use of an annotated version.
Appending the text with critical or explanatory notes strongly points to a conclusion
that such a version of MOA would indeed be used principally, as Judge Brunetti
suggested, "to identify Armstrong's historical, doctrinal, and social errors. '4 69 Given
this, Judge Brunetti is correct in positing that evangelizing with an annotation is
unlikely to occur.470 To attract members to its church with such a work, a reader
would have to read Armstrong's words-the material WCG views as its "Christian
duty" to keep hidden-and then read the annotations for the critical or explanatory
460. Id. at 1119.
461. Id.
462. See Dratler, supra note 46, at 325 (arguing that a congruence of function analysis should not dominate
the market effect analysis).
463. See id. at 326 (commenting on a case that merely presumed a market effect because a copyrighted song
and its parody were commercialized similarly in the same medium, serving the same function).
464. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1124 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
465. 803 F.2d at 1254.
466. Id. at 1256-57.
467. Id. at 1264.
468. Id.
469. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1124 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
470. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
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notes to cull WCG's doctrines.47 1 Similar to the potential customers for the later
edition of the original work in Maxtone-Graham, individuals who already adhere
to WCG's doctrines, or who are unfamiliar but would be receptive to an annotation
expounding them, would doubtfully withdraw interest for the work because there
already exists PCG's work that, to them, constitutes ecclesiastical error. Hence, both
the district court and the dissent were correct that under the facts before the court the
two works would not compete.
b. Reproduction Unlikely
As to any later reproduction by WCG of MOA in its original form, though
PCG's use would indeed likely serve a displacing function in the market, the court
should have, under the circumstances presented, disregarded any such argument by
WCG. The Supreme Court's discussion in Campbell of potential markets for
parodies provides a basis for analysis. There the Court stated that the "market for
potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would
in general develop or license others to develop." '472 As such, the Court suggested that
parodies and criticisms of original works are not part of the potential licensing
market to be considered.47 3 WCG, of course, presently has the copyright in MOA' s
original form, and with that, an inquiry into whether the original is part of a potential
derivative market is improper. However, the Supreme Court's argument in Campbell
is nonetheless relevant here. WCG's position regarding Armstrong's original book
is clear; it stopped distribution in part because it "would offend cultural standards
of social sensitivity, and dissemination would perpetrate... ecclesiastical error.
' 474
Any such reproduction and dissemination of MOA in its original form would stand
as the opposition, the critical work, to any future annotation produced by WCG and
its current doctrine. Given such a position, occurring as a product of WCG's
doctrinal shift and its resulting "Christian duty" to keep Armstrong's views from
circulation, it appears highly unlikely that WCG itself would develop a market for
MOA in its original version, let alone license such a market to others, including
PCG.
The majority's assertion that a copyright owner who has disavowed intention
to publish his work has the "right to change his mind ' 475 does not change the
analysis. The Campbell court certainly could have recognized that the creator of a
work may over time become disenchanted with the original work, and in such a
situation, would indeed consider either criticizing or lampooning the work or
licensing others to do so. The mere possibility of that contingency, however remote,
471. Id.
472. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
473. Id.
474. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1119.
475. Id.
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would tend to suggest that those markets should in fact be part of the fourth-inquiry.
Yet the Court did not discuss such a contingency. The absence of such analysis
suggests that a court should evaluate the facts as they exist before the court, and not
engage in speculative possibilities. As the facts exist here, MOA in its original form
has no value to WCG beyond a source from which to write its annotation, and since
the only evidence for future publication is WCG's indication of a desire to produce
an annotation in the future, later reproduction of MOA as Armstrong originally
wrote it appears highly improbable. Therefore, the majority improperly found that
PCG's version would conflict with WCG's interest.
V. CONCLUSION
Copyright law has the principal purpose of encouraging the creation of works
of authorship, with the subsequent dissemination of such works increasing the
public pool of knowledge.476 Recognizing statutory fair uses of copyrighted works
is thus an integral part of this overall scheme, as fair uses themselves encourage the
creation of new works of authorship.477 As the Supreme Court stated in its last
opportunity to write on the topic, a court is to analyze fair use "in light of the
purposes of copyright.,
478
This is precisely what the majority in Worldwide Church of God failed to do
when it applied section 107 of the 1976 Act. The majority analyzed the statutory fair
use factors, but without regularly addressing the broader question of whether the
goals of copyright would be served by allowing PCG to fairly use MOA.479
Furthermore, the court neither reasonably balanced the equities nor gave a common-
sense evaluation in determining if the goals of copyright law would be furthered, or
rather whether WCG's creativity would be stifled.48° Instead, the majority reasoned
an opinion that misapplied fair use jurisprudence and quite simply defies an appeal
to common sense regarding the situation.481 The majority has simply allowed one
church to blot out the religious writings observed by another, thereby diminishing
the contribution to the public's store of knowledge. This decision has likewise
decreased WCG's impulse to create its annotation to correct MOA's errors, since,
by its control, WCG is assured that no new copies will enter circulation. Forgetting
the underlying goals of copyright law, the Ninth Circuit merely prohibited a
harmless use without any countervailing benefit.
476. See supra Part II.A (discussing the goals of American copyright law).
477. Supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
478. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
479. See supra Part IV (criticizing the majority's analysis of the section 107 statutory factors).
480. See supra Part IV.A (criticizing the majority's opinion concerning considerations apart from the section
107 factors).
48 1. See supra Part IV (reviewing the majority's opinion and arguing how the court should have applied the
fair use analysis).
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Recently, the United States Supreme Court denied PCG's petition for certiorari
in this case.482 Given the unsound application of fair use under the facts of this case,
the Supreme Court's denial is a lamentable act. Hopefully, courts in the future will
better consider the underpinning purposes of copyright law when determining
whether a secondary user of a copyrighted work should be protected as a fair user.
Only by this is an analysis done in light of the purposes of the copyright.
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2001) (cert. denied).

